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# Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Indeterminate Perception

## *Nirvikalpakavāda*

## PART TWO

SIBAJIBAN BHATTACHARYYA

[illegible] Sharma, Varanasi Collection

In this Part Two the text of Nirvikalpakavāda section of Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi has been translated and explained with the help of two commentaries, Āloka of Jayadeva Miśra and Prakāśa of Rucidatta Miśra.

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# GAṄGEŚA'S THEORY OF INDETERMINATE PERCEPTION

## Part Two

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CONTAINING THE TEXT OF

GAṄGEŚA'S *Nirvikalpakavāda*

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND

EXPLANATORY NOTES

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SIBAJIBAN BHATTACHARYYA

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To
the memory of
my grandfather
पञ्चानन तर्करत्न

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# PREFACE

In this Part Two, the text of *Nirvikalpakavāda* is reproduced from Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (*TCM*) (Part I) edited by Dr. N.S. Rāmānuja Tātāchārya. I have excluded Gaṅgeśa's *Viśeṣaṇopalakṣaṇavāda* section from this book as it forms a separate chapter in Tātāchārya's edition. I have explained Gaṅgeśa's text with the help of two commentaries, Jayadeva Miśra's *Āloka* published in *TCM*, edited by Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgīśa, and Rucidatta's *Prakāśa* published in Dr. Tātāchārya's edition. I have given the relevant portions of the texts of the commentaries in an appendix (Notes and References) at the end of the book.

I have found a special difficulty in translating and explaining Gaṅgeśa's text. There are passages where Gaṅgeśa is obviously stating the opponent's position; but there are also passages where it is not clear whether he is stating an opponent's position or his own. Moreover, in replies to objections, it is not always clear whether Gaṅgeśa is stating his own position, or the position of someone else supporting the Nyāya theory. In such ambiguous passages, I have tried to follow the clarifications given in the commentaries; but it may be that I am mistaken in my reading of the case. I leave it to experts to judge on this point.

There are also many passages in Gaṅgeśa's text which were unclear to me. I must thank Dr. N.S. Rāmānuja Tātāchārya, who in spite of his heavy schedule of work as Vice-Chancellor of Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyāpeetha, Tirupati, was kind enough to remove my doubts with his characteristic clarity and depth of understanding of Navya-Nyāya texts. I only hope that I have presented his views correctly from memory. Without his help the book would have been worse than it is.

I thank Professor Stephen Phillips of the University of Texas at Austin for correcting typographical errors and grammatical mistakes, and for suggesting various improvements.

I also thank Professor K.T. Pandurangi and Dr. D. Prahladachar of Bangalore University for explaining to me some passages of *Prakaraṇa-pãncikā* which I have included here.

Calcutta
January 23, 1992 Sibajiban Bhattacharyya

# GLOSSARY

ākāṅkṣā —— expectancy
ālocana —— determinate cognition
anavasthā ——infinite regress
anumāna —— inference, instrumental cause of cognition of the conclusion
anumiti —— (cognition of) inferential conclusion
avacchedaka —— limitor
hetu —— probans
kāraṇatā vacchedaka —— limitor of causeness
kāryatā vacchedaka —— limitor of effectness
nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa —— indeterminate perception
padārtha —— meaning of a word
padarthatā vacchedaka —— limitor of meantness
pakṣa —— locus of inference
pakṣadharmatā —— presence of the probans in the locus of inference
prakāra —— mode or qualifier of a cognition
pratiyogin ——counter-positive of a negation, the second term of a relation
pratiyogitā vacchedaka —— limitor of counter-positiveness
pratyabhijñā —— recognition
sādhya —— probandum
sannikarṣa —— epistemic relation between a sense-organ and object
savikalpaka pratyakṣa —— determinate perception
tattānubhava —— informative cognition of thatness
udbodhaka —— excitor
upamāna —— instrumental cause of cognition by analogy
upamiti —— cognition by analogy
upasthiti —— memory
viśeṣaṇa —— qualifier
viśeṣaṇatā vacchedaka —— limitor of qualifierness
viśeṣya —— qualificand

viśeṣyatā vacchedaka —— limitor of qualificandness
viśiṣṭajñāna —— qualificative cognition
vyāpaka —— pervader
vyāpakatā vacchedaka —— limitor of the pervaderness
vyāpti —— pervasion, invariable concomitance
vyāpya —— the pervaded
vyapyatā vacchedaka ——limitor of the pervadedness
vyavahāra —— use of words

# अथ निर्विकल्पकवादः

## 1. Gaṅgeśa's theory of two kinds of perception, indeterminate and determinate

**तच्च प्रत्यक्षं द्विविधं निर्विकल्पकं सविकल्पकं चेति ।**

**Translation:** And that perception is of two kinds—indeterminate and determinate.

**Explanation :** 'That perception' means the perception as has been defined by Gaṅgeśa earlier. He has given two definitions of perception; here I explain the second definition. 'Perception' is defined as that cognition which does not have another cognition as its instrumental cause (*karaṇa*).[1] An instrumental cause is not just any cause, but a special cause which has an operation. An operation is an effect of the instrumental cause and also a cause of another effect of the instrumental cause. For example, when a woodcutter fells a tree with an axe, the axe is the instrumental cause of the felling of the tree. Its operation is the contact of the axe with the tree.[2] The contact of the axe is an effect of the axe and yet this contact is also a cause of the felling of the tree which is also an effect of the instrumental cause. This may be explained with the help of a diagram thus :



Contact of the axe with the tree is, therefore, the operation of the axe. The coming together of the axe with the tree cannot be the operation, for contact is the effect of coming together and contact is the cause of the felling of the tree. Hence the coming together is a cause of a cause of the felling of the tree.

Perception is a cognition which cannot have another cognition as its instrumental cause. But in various types of perception many factors like memory function as causes. Memory is a cause, but not the instrumental cause, of different types of perception.

Gaṅgeśa has concluded the immediately preceding chapter with an explanation of a secondary (introspective) cognition of a primary cognition of an object. For example, if the primary cognition is of a jar, the secondary cognition is of the form 'I cognize the cognition of a jar'. Gaṅgeśa's explanation is that the cognition is perceived indeterminately in introspection while the cognition of a jar is a determinate perception. Thus the whole introspective cognition is in one part indeterminate and in another part determinate. Any cognition the structure of the object of which is a composite of incongruous parts, as in this case, is technically called a cognition of the form 'of a half man and half lion'. This has reference to Indian mythology where the Lord Viṣṇu assumed the form of half a man and half a lion in order to kill the giant Hiraṇyakaśipu. So any cognition with a composite structure of incongruous parts is described as a cognition of the man-lion form.

**Opponent :** The position of the opponent has been explained differently by different commentators of Gaṅgeśa. Rucidatta in his *Prakāśa* explains the opponent's position as follows. Any cognition of man-lion form is unproved because there is no indeterminate perception, so determinate perception is the only kind of perception.[3] Jayadeva Miśra in his *Āloka* explains the opponent's position as follows. A cognition of the man-lion form is unproved, for determinate perception being produced by perception cannot be regarded as a perception at all. So indeterminate perception is the only kind of perception.[4]

Whether determinate or indeterminate perception be the only kind of perception, there cannot be any cognition of the man-lion form, as held by Gaṅgeśa.

**Reply :** So the commentators hold that for this reason Gaṅgeśa has begun this chapter with 'and that ....' in which sentence he asserts that there are two kinds of perception — indeterminate and determinate. This is in response to the opponent's objection that either determinate perception or indeterminate perception is the only kind of perception.

**Opponent :** If both indeterminate and determinate perceptions be admitted, still one and the same cognition cannot be regarded as both determinate and indeterminate. For indeteminateness and determinateness are mutually exclusive universals (*viruddhajāti*) so nothing can be an instance of both. According to Gaṅgeśa the introspective cognition is both determinate and indeterminate. The opponent argues that this is not possible.[5]

**Reply :** According to Gaṅgeśa indeterminateness and determinateness of perecption are not universals at all, and hence not mutually exclusive universals. This is because whether a perception is determinate or indeterminate is determined by the object perceived, and not by any property inherent in the perceptions.[6]

Hence determinateness and indeterminateness of a perception being determined by its relation to objects are not universals and hence not mutually exclusive universals. They are imposed properties (*upādhis*). Mutually exclusive imposed properties may belong to one and the same object without any difficulty. This is because universals classify objects according to their natural kinds and hence mutually exclusive universals cannot belong to the same object, for this would mean that the object would belong to two different natural kinds. But imposed properties do not classify objects. Hence there is no difficulty in two so imposed properties belonging to one and the same object.

No Nyāya philosopher, however, admits the possibility of one cognition being perceptual in one part and inferential in another. This is because, according to Nyāya, perception, inference and other kinds of cognition are instances of different universals. Thus being a perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣatva*) is one universal, and being inferential cognition (*anumitiva*) is another universal, and they are mutually exclusive. So no cognition can be both perceptual and inferential. But indeterminateness and determinateness of perception are not universals, and hence there is no difficulty in one perception being both determinate and indeterminate at the same time.

### 1.00 Gaṅgeśa's explication of indeterminate perception

**तत्र नामजात्यादियोजनारहितं वैशिष्ट्यानवगाहि निष्प्रकारकं निर्विकल्पकम् ।**

**Translation :** Of these (two), indeterminate perception is that in which no names, universals etc. are introduced, which is not of a relation, and which does not have any mode.

**Explanation :** According to Nyāya there is one kind of perecption in which a relation (between two objects) gets cognized. This is determinate perception. To cognize a relation between two objects is to cognize one object as the other. This is fundamentally different from the Western theories that to perceive a relation is to perceive a fact which is stated in a proposition (sentence). According to Nyāya even determinate perception in which we cognize a relation between two objects can be expressed by one word. For example, when I perceive a jar in determinate perception I perceive it as jarness-possessing. The expression 'possessing' indicates a relation between the jar and jarness. So to perceive one object as possessing another object which is called the 'property of the object' is really the mode (*prakāra*) under which the object (*viśeṣya*) is cognized. In determinate perception there is always a mode under which an object is cognized.

A determinate perception is a qualificative cognition the object of which is a relational complex of the form *aRb*. We now introduce three epistemic definitions :

**Definition 1.** Qualificand of a qualificative cognition : *a* in the cognized structure *aRb* is called 'the qualificand of the cognition', as well as 'the qualificand of *b*'.

**Definition 2.** Qualifier (mode) of a qualificative cognition : *b* in the cognized structure *aRb* is called 'the qualifier (mode) of the cognition', as well as 'the qualifier (mode) of *a'*.

**Definition 3.** Qualification of a qualificative cognition : *R* in the cognized structure *aRb* is called 'the qualification of the cognition'.

So *aRb* is a complex term, not a sentence as in Western logic. It is interpreted as '*a as* related to *b by* R', and not as '*a is* related to *b* by *R*'.

There is a more complex form of qualificative cognition, viz. doubly qualificative cognition. For example, when we cognize a stick, being a stick is the qualifier of the stick which is the qualificand. But when we cognize the first order cognition of the stick then the first order cognition is the qualificand of which the stick is the qualifier and being the stick is the qualifier of the qualifier. Thus this is an example of a doubly qualificative cognition (*viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyā 'vagāhi-jñānam*). It may be represented symbolically as *aR (bRc)*.This is well-formed because *bRc* is one complex term and not a sentence.

In indeterminate perception which is defined here, there is no cognition of a relation between two objects. It is not a perception of an object under any mode. It is a direct acquaintance with an object.

According to Nyāya, however, perceptions, whether determinate or indeterminate, do not involve any names or words. Gaṅgeśa has explained indeterminate perception apparently in terms of three negative characteristics—(i) there is no introduction of names, universals etc., (ii) it is not a cognition of any relation, (iii) and it does not have any mode. Now (ii) and (iii) are almost equivalent, for if there is no relation cognized in a perception, there cannot be any mode of the perception. Conversely, if there is no mode cognized in a perception, then it cannot be a perception of any relation. This is because the Nyāya theory is that the cognition of a relation is always the cognition of one object *as* another, one object as a mode of the other by the relation.

Perceptions, determinate or indeterminate, do not involve any words i.e., when we perceive an object we do not cognize its name, although in determinate perception we know at least one of its properties. Hence to characterize indeterminate perception as that in which we do not know names of objects becomes inappropriate. As a matter of fact Rucidatta explains the term *'nāma-yojanā-rahitam'* as *'vaiśiṣṭyā'navagāhi'*. That is, Rucidatta explains (i) as the same as (ii). But then the question arises : why should Gaṅgeśa give (i) ? If (i) and (ii) are one and the same thing then giving two characteristics is really a repetition of one characteristic. This opens one to the objection of useless repetition.

It may appear from the text of Gaṅgeśa that Gaṅgeśa did not accept the theory that in determinate perception words are not involved. If words are, as a rule, involved in determinate perception, then indeterminate perception can be defined correctly as that which does not involve the use of words. But this reading of Gaṅgeśa is not justified by what Gaṅgeśa has explicitly stated about determinate perception. So the commentators like Rucidatta have interpreted (i) as meaning just the same as (ii). But Rucidatta does not explain how the charge of useless repetion can be answered. The only solution seems to be regard (ii) merely as an explication of (i)

### 1.1 Criticism: No need to postulate indeterminate perception

ननु ज्ञानत्वं सविकल्पकभिन्नवृत्ति इत्यत्र किं मानम् । न प्रत्यक्षम्, असिद्धेः, अतीन्द्रियत्वाभ्युपगमाच्च । न च

व्यवहारः, तस्य सविकल्पकसाध्यत्वात् । नापीदं न विवचितं पूर्वमधुना विवेचयामीत्यनुभवप्रमाणकावालोचनविकल्पौ, बहुविशेषणज्ञानाज्ञानाभ्यां तदुपपत्तेः ।

**Translation :** (Obj.) What evidence is there for holding that cognitionhood is located in anything other than determinate perception ? It cannot be perception for it is not established. Moreover, indeterminate perception is beyond the range of sense perception. It cannot be use of words, for that comes about only by determinate perception. It also cannot be argued that the evidence of indeterminate and determinate perception is the introspective evidence that I did not determine it before, but I am now determining it. For this difference can be explained by cognition and non-cognition of many qualifiers.

**Explanation :** The opponent argues that there is no reason to postulate the existence of any perception other than determinate perception. The evidence, if any, for indeterminate perception can be of three kinds—internal perception or introspection, inference based upon verbal usage, or introspective evidence of different kinds of perception. The opponent argues that none of these alleged grounds is adequate. We cannot prove the existence of indeterminate perception by introspection. For there is no such introspective evidence for the existence of indeterminate perception. Jayadeva Miśra here argues that it is not a controversy over a fact. It is not a controversy over whether we do or do not have introspective awareness of indeterminate perception.[8] The point is that, whether we have or do not have a particular type of cognition can be settled, in appropriate cases, by introspection. According to Nyāya, a cognition reveals only its object, but never itself or the subject. Thus, when I know a table, this knowledge will be expressed as, 'this is a table', but never as 'I know that it is a table'. For in the knowledge of the table, it is the table which is the object of knowledge, but nor the knowledge of the table, and not the subject. In order to know a primary knowledge about an object, a secondary knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*) which has the primary knowledge as its object is necessary. So if there is any indeterminate perception, it can be known directly only in introspection. But there can be no such introspective awarencess of indeterminate perecption. According to Nyāya, indeterminate perception cannot be an object of sensory perception. Introspection is inner perception depending upon the function of the inner sense (*manas* which is *antaḥkaraṇa)*. This argument proves that there cannot be any secondary perception of indeterminate perception in introspection. This is because the secondary perception must be a doubly qualificative cognition. Yet indeterminate perception is not a qualificative cognition at all, hence, its cognition cannot be a doubly qualificative cognition.

This argument proves that it is not a controversy over a mere fact whether there is or there is not introspective perception of an indeterminate perception.

The second agrument is that indeterminate perception may be the cause of use of words, and hence from the use of words the existence of indeterminate perception may be inferred. The opponent now points out that use of words is possible only when one has determinate perception.

This is because of the Nyāya theory of how a word means an object. A word can mean an object only under a mode. If a mode is not cognized the object cannot be meant by a word. Nyāya does not accept the existence of what Russell calls 'logically proper names' which refer to objects under no mode. Indeterminate perception being a direct acquaintance with an object without any mode cannot be the cause of use of words. It is only determinate perception which is a cognition of an object under a mode which can be a cause of use of words.

The opponent then considers another kind of introspective evidence for indeterminate perception. The argument is that sometimes we have introspective knowledge that we did not know the object under any mode but are now knowing it under a mode. This shows that there is a primitive stage of perception where we are directly acquainted with the object without knowing its name or any property.

The opponent argues that it is not necessary to postulate this primitive stage of perception in order to explain this introspective knowledge. For it is sufficient to hold that at the prior stage we did not know the object with as many properties as we do now. At the earlier stage, therefore, we knew the object as possesing fewer properties than what we now know. There is an increase in knowledge about an object because there is an increase in the number of properties known. There is no stage of knowledge where we know an object without any property at all. The so-called indeterminate perception is really a less determinate perception.

### 2.1 Gaṅgeśa's argument for qualificative cognition being caused by cognition of a qualifier and its criticism

**ननु गौरिति प्रत्यक्षं विशेषणज्ञानजन्यम्, विशिष्टज्ञानत्वात् अनुमितिवदिति । अथ विशेषणविशेष्यज्ञानसामग्रीतः साकाड्क्षोभयविषयमेकं विशिष्टज्ञानम् । तत्र प्रत्यक्षे योग्येन्द्रियसंनिकर्षात्, अनुमितौ पक्षधर्मताबलात् व्यापकत्वावच्छेदकप्रकारेण, शाब्दे योग्यतादिवशात् पदार्थतावच्छेदकरूपेणापूर्वमेव विशषणं भासते, उपमितावप्येवमेवेति न क्वापि विशेषणज्ञानं जनकम् । न च प्रत्यभिज्ञायां तत्तानुभवस्तथा । तत्तानुभवेऽपि संस्कारस्यानुद्बोधात्, विलोपाद्वा प्रत्यभिज्ञानानुत्पादेन उदबुद्धः संस्कार एव प्रत्यासत्तितया विशेषणज्ञानार्थमिन्द्रियसहकारी। सुरभिचन्दनमित्यादावपि विशेषणज्ञानार्थं तज्ज्ञानं**

**प्रत्यासत्तिस्थानीयमिन्द्रियसहकारि । भ्रमो विशिष्टज्ञानमेव नास्तीति चेत् –**

**Translation** (Obj.) The Nyāya argument is : the (determinate) perception of the form '(the) cow' is caused by a (prior) cognition of the qualifier, the reason being that is is a qualificative cognition like, for example, inference. This argument is not valid, for one qualificative cognition produced by the totality of causes of the cognition of the qualifier and the qualificand is about both objects having reciprocal expectancy. Among these, in perception, from the sense-organ contact with an object fit for perception, in inference on the strength of the presence of the probans in the locus of inference (cognition) under the mode of the limitor of pervaderness, in verbal cognition by virtue of (semantic) fitness etc., a qualifier not previously known gets manifested in the form of the limitor of being the referent of the word. So also in analogy; a cognition of a qualifier is nowhere the cause (of a qualificative cognition). Neither is informative cognition of that-ness in recognition. Even when there is informative cognition of thatness still when memory traces are either not activated or are erased no recognition is produced. Hence it is the activated memory trace which is, an (epistemic) contact, auxiliary to the sense organs for the cognition of the qualifiers. So also in the case of visual cognition that the sandal wood is fragrant the cognition of the qualifier functions as the (epistemic) contact auxiliary to the sense organs. And illusion is not a qualificative cognition at all.

**Explanation** : The Nyāya argument for indeterminate perception is presented in the form of an inference for the sake of others which consists of five sentences as its parts (*avayava*) thus :

(1) Proposition : The (determinate) perception of the form '(the) cow' is produced by a cognition of the qualifier.

(2) Reason : Because this is a qualificative cognition.

(3) Pervasion with example : Every qualificative cognition is produced by a (prior) cognition of the qualifier, for example, inference.
(The fourth and fifth members are not stated but can be supplied very easily).
(4) Application : The perception of the form '(the) cow' is a qualificative cognition.
(5) Concusion : Hence, it is produced by a cognition of the qualifier.

The cognition of the qualifier cannot itself be a determinate perception which, in its turn, will need a cognition of its qualifier and so on ad infinitum. So to stop this infinite regress the Nyāya philosophers hold that a determinate perception which is a qualificative cognition having a qualificand, a qualifier, and a relation between them as its complex object can be produced only if there is a prior cognition of the qualifier. The point is that if I perceive what is objectively a cow *as* a cow, i.e., as cowness-possessing, then the cognition of cowness existing at the moment preceding the perception is necessary. I might have perceived what is objectively a cow not as a cow but simply as an animal, or as a white object and so on. In Western philosophy perception is regarded as selective, because the object perceived always possesses almost an infinite richness of properties which cannot be perceived all at once. So every particular act of perception is selective in the sense that a particular property of the object is perceived. The Nyāya theory is that this selection of the property perceived in the object is not arbitrary. It is epistemologically determined by the cognition of the particular property which happens to be present in the self when one perceives the object. But how is the cognition of the particular property to be explained ? The property must itself be perceptible and with veridical cognition be present in a perceptible object; the object is perceived through the property, but the property itself is perceived not again through a property, but directly. This perception which precedes the perception of the object through a mode, i.e., through a qualifier, is not a perception through a mode, i.e., it is an indeterminate perception. This is the Nyāya argument for indeterminate perception.

The opponent, however, challenges this argument by not merely denying the pervasion at (3) which will be, some qualificative cognition is not caused by a prior cognition of the qualifier, but by a stronger assertion that no qualificative cognition is caused in that way. This stronger assertion the opponent proves by examining different types of qualificative cognition. He examines perception, inference, verbal knowledge, analogy, recognition and the visual perception that a piece of sandal wood is fragrant. We shall presently explain the opponent's agrument case by case.

But he proves also a general theory that no qualificative cognition is produced by a cognition of the qualifier. His general argument is as follows :

A qualificative cognition is really a cognition of the qualifier and the qualificand without a cognition of a relation between them. A qualificative cognition is one cognition about two objects. Both the objects, namely, the qualificand and the qualifier are perceived. There are causes which produce the cognition of the qualifier and the qualificand. When the totality of these causes is present one ought to have two cognitions of the qualifier and the qualificand. But because there is mutual expectancy between the qualifier and the qualificand, there is only one qualificative cognition resulting from the totality of causes.

Jayadeva Miśra in his *Āloka* explains that if a qualificative cognition was about a relation (between the qualifier and the qualificand) then the qualifier by being a term of the relation of the qualificative cognition has to be cognized prior to the qualificative cognition.[9] For it is not possible to know a relation without knowing its terms. Hence the opponent denies the cognition of a relation in a qualificative cognition, by using the concept of expectancy.

Rucidatta in his *Prakāśa* explains the concept of expectancy thus. Two objects have expectancy in the sense that there is absence of cognition of their non-relatedness. If there are two objects but we do not cognize their unrelatedness, then we shall have one cognition of one object qualified by the other.[10] He gives a second interpretation of expectancy which some other philosophers propose. Two objects have expectancy if and only if they are related as limitor and limited.[11] The point is that in the Nyāya interpretation of a qualificative cognition, where there is a cognition of a relation, the qualifier and the qualificand of the qualificative cognition are correlatives; i.e., the property of being the qualifier determines the property of being the qualificand and vice-versa, they are not the limitor and the limited of each other. The opponent's position is that two objects having expectancy are cognized in one qualificative cognition by being objects of one cognition without any relation between them being cognized. They are yet objects of one cognition. The problem is to explain the unity of the cognition of two objects having expectancy. The problem is solved by postulating that of the two objects being cognized in one cognition, one becomes the limitor and the other the limited by the limitor. So the opponent explains a qualificative cognition without postulating a prior indeterminate cognition of the qualifier. When we have a cognition of a cow as cowness-possessing, there is realy one cognition of two unconnected objects, namely, the cow and cowness. But because cow and cowness have expectancy there is one cognition of the cow as cowness-possessing.

Now the opponent proves his conclusion that in no case a qualificative cognition is caused by a prior cognition of the qualifier by examining different cases of determinate perception. He first explains how a determinate perception can be explained without postulating a prior cognition of the qualifier as a cause. When we perceive a cow as cowness-possessing, the cowness is as much perceptible as the cow. As there is an epistemic relation between the visual sense organ and the cowness it becomes perceived when we perceive a cow in determinate perception.

In inference for oneself the conclusion is always a qualificative cognition. For example, when we infer the hill as fire-possessing, fire is the qualifier and the hill is the qualificand of the qualificative cognition. This inference for oneself requires two cognitions as its causes :-

(a) First we have to cognize with certainty that smoke is pervaded by fire (i.e., wherever there is smoke there is fire).

(b) Then we have to perceive the hill as smoke-possessing (i.e., the hill has smoke on it).

(c) By combining these two cognitions we get a doubly qualificative cognition of the form—the hill possesses smoke pervaded by fire. This is a doubly qualificative cognition because the hill is qualified by smoke which is qualified by pervasion by fire. To cognize a pervasion which is a relation between a pervader and a pervaded, it is necessary to cognize both under certain modes. The mode under which the pervader is cognized is called 'the limitor of being the pervader' and the mode under which the pervaded is cognized is called 'the limitor of being pervaded'. In the above example, fireness is the limitor of the pervaderness and smokeness is the limitor of the pervadedness. This is because the pervasion is a relation between smoke as smoke and fire as fire. In (b) we have to cognize the presence of the pervaded in the locus of the inference which is the hill in this example. Now it is agrued by Nyāya philosophers that we can conclude that the hill is fire-possessing only when we cognize fireness. For to cognize fire as fire we have to cognize fire as the locus of fireness. But fireness is to be cognized under no mode at all, i.e., in indeterminate perception. Thus to infer the conclusion, one has to cognize the limitor of the pervaderness in indeterminate perception.

The opponent, however, challenges this explanation and offers another which avoids indeterminate perception of the qualifier. His explanation is that in the conclusion we cognize fire under the mode of fireness which is the limitor of the pervaderness on the strength of the presence of the pervaded in the locus of the inference. The point is that there is no need to postulate an indeterminate perception, for when we cognize the pervasion as a relation between the pervader and the pervaded we have to cognize them under their modes; so the pervader is cognized as that which is qualified by the limitor of pervaderness. So fireness is cognized as the qualifier of fire on the basis of the presence of smoke in the hill.

In cognizing the meaning of a word, the object has to be cognized under a mode which is the limitor of being meant by the word. The Nyāya argument is that we can cognize the meaning of the word 'cow' only as that which is qualified by cowness. Anyone who does not have a prior cognition of cowness cannot cognize the meaning of the word 'cow'. It may be argued that cowness can be cognized only in a prior indeterminate perception. The opponent rejects this argument by pointing out that a novel qualifier previously not cognized becomes cognized as the limitor of being meant by a word because of semantic fitness etc. It is the word which by its semantic power reveals new qualifiers not previously cognized at the time one cognizes the meaning of a word. A word can mean an object only under a mode; so the mode is part of the meaning of the word. The object is what is meant; the mode is the limitor of meantness residing in what is meant by the word.

So also in analogy, cognition of the qualifier is not a cause of a qualified cognition. For analogy is the cognition of the meaning of a word on the basis of perceived similarity. It has been already shown that in the case of cognition of word meaning, a prior cognition of the qualifier is not necessary.

In recognition also the case is the same. In recognition of the form 'this is that Davadatta' the cognition of thatness is presupposed. For 'that' means Devadatta as perceived earlier. So it might appear that the cognition of thatness is presupposed in recognition. The opponent, however, points out that past cognition of thatness cannot be a cause, for the past cognition cannot continue as a cognition, but is present in the self in the form of an impression (*saṁskāra*) of the past cognition. If this memory impression is not recalled or is erased, then there is no recognition. This proves that it is the activated impression which is an auxiliary factor functioning with the sense organ as the epistemic relation between the sense organ and the qualifier in order to produce the cognition of the qualifier. As the cognition of the qualifier is thus perceptual in nature, this cognition cannot be presupposed as its cause. This cognition is determinate perception and not indeterminate.

According to Nyāya we have visual perception of a piece of sandal wood as fragrant. This is a special type of perception (*alaukika*). For it a prior knowledge of fragrance is necessary which can only be obtained by olfactory perception. A person who did not have this prior olfactory perception could not have perceived visually a piece of sandal wood as fragrant. The opponent points out that even in this case there is no need to postulate any indeterminate perception, for the cognition of fragrance acts merely as epistemic relation and is an auxiliary factor in the functioning of the visual sense organ.

Nyāya admits illusory perception and explains it in terms of a prior indeterminate perception. The opponent who is a Mīmāṁsaka does not admit any illusory perception at all. According to him, the so-called illusory perception is not one qualificative cognition but is really a couple of cognitions of different types not distinguished by the knower.

### 2.11. Gaṅgeśa's reply

**उच्यते। साध्यप्रसिद्धिपदार्थोपस्थितिवाच्यत्वज्ञानतत्तानुभवानाम् अनुमित्यादिहेतुत्वम् । साध्यप्रसिद्ध्यादिकं विना**

**अनुमित्यादेरसंभवात् । साध्यादिकं च विशेषणमिति तज्ज्ञानमनुमित्यादिहेतुः । यद्यपि अनुमित्यादिप्रत्येकं प्रति साध्यादिविशेषणज्ञानत्वेन न कारणता । तथापि विशिष्टज्ञानमात्रं प्रति विशेषणज्ञानत्वेन कारणता, बाधकाभावात् ।**

**Translation :** It is said (by me in reply). Cognition of the probandum (prior to its cognition in the conclusion), memory of what is meant by a word, cognition of significance, informative cognition of that-ness are causes of the inferential conclusion etc. Without a prior cognition of the probandum, etc., no inferential conclusion etc. is possible. The probandum etc., is the qualifier, and its cognition is a cause of the inferential cognition etc. Although the cause of every particular inference is not the cognition of the probandum etc. as qualifer, yet as a merely qualificative cognition an inference etc. is caused by a cognition of the qualifier, for there is no inconsistency here.

**Explanation :** The opponent has argued that in an inferential conclusion, say, of the form (the) hill (is) fire-possessing, where fire is the probandum and is also the qualifier of the locus of the inference, (the) hill, fireness is cognized for the first time in the conclusion on the strength of the presence of the probans (smoke) in the locus (hill), as the limitor of the pervaderness. But Gaṅgeśa points out that the probandum has to be cognized prior to its cognition in the conclusion. If we use the language of Western syllogism to explain Gaṅgeśa's point, the probandum, which very roughly corresponds to the object meant by the major term, must be known in the major premise, prior to being known in the conclusion. Without the major term in the major premise being known the conclusion cannot be drawn.

Now the probandum, fire, is the qualifier in the conclusion— (the) hill (is) fire-possessing, and hence it has to be cognized before the conclusion can be cognized and fire can be cognized only when fireness is cognized.

(Obj.) : Rucidatta here points out that the prior cognition of the probandum as cognition of the probandum is not the cause of the conclusion. For the cognition (firm belief) of pervasion as the cognition of pervasion is the cause of the conclusion which follows from it and it is not delayed because cognition of the probandum as cognition of the probandum is delayed. For the cause of the conclusion is the cognition of pervasion as cognition of pervasion, not as cognition of the probandum.[12]

Jayadeva Miśra states this objection a bit differently. The prior cognition of the probandum is not a cause of the conclusion, but the cognition of pervasion is the cause. Now if it is argued that cognition of pervasion which is a relation of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum is not possible without cognizing the probandum, then the cognition of the probandum becomes a cause of the cognition of pervasion which is a cause of the inferential cognition. But then the cognition of the probandum becomes a cause of a cause of the conclusion, and, hence, is not a cause of the conclusion.[13]

Jayadeva Miśra replies to this objection by stating that it is the cognition of pervasion which is the prior cognition of the probandum. Because it is not something other, the prior cognition of the probandum is not debarred from being a cause of the conclusion.[14]

Gaṅgeśa replies to the opponent by examining the different cases of qualificative cognition which the opponent discussed. Inference was the first example discussed by the opponent. Hence Gaṅgeśa first of all refutes this objection. After this Gaṅgeśa refutes the objection of the opponent by examining verbal cognition, analogy, recognition in the order in which the opponent discussed them.

The opponent has argued that verbal cognition, where an object is always cognized under a mode, does not require the prior cognition of the mode (qualifier). He has argued that by semantic fitness, the qualifier as limitor of being meant by a word, even a novel property, is cognized. Now Gaṅgeśa points out that cognizing the meaning of a word is impossible without the memory of the object meant by the word. In this memory it is the mode or the qualifier which is present as the cognized object. For example, the meaning of the word 'cow' is whatever possesses cowness. To cognize the meaning of the word 'cow' one has to remember cowness. Hence in verbal cognition, the cognition of the qualifier must be present antecedently and hence this cognition of the qualifier really functions as a cause of the verbal cognition.

About analogy by which we cognize the meaning of a word on the basis of a perceived similarity between a known and an unknown object, Gaṅgeśa points out that a prior cognition of being meant by the word is necessary.

In the case of recognition of the form 'this is that Devadatta' it is the prior perception of thatness which is a cause of the recognition.

Now the question arises if the cognition of the probandum is a cause of the conclusion which is a qualificative cognition, then how is the theory that the cognition of the qualifier is a cause of qualificative cognition proved ? The answer to this question is that the cognition of a conclusion is one type of qualificative cognition and the cognition of the probandum functions as the cognition of the qualifier in producing this qualificative cognition. The point is that if a specific cause of a specific effect is established, then a general causal connection is also established, if there is no difficulty.This may be explained as follows.

Whenever we want to establish a general causal law, we have to consider only special, particular, instances. For example, if we want to establish the general causal connection between fuel and fire, we cannot get any fuel in general and fire in general; we can have only particular instances of fuel like dried grass, pieces of wood etc. And there is also no general dried grass, too. In one particular instance, we can get only one particular bundle of grass particulars. This being the case, it will be impossible to establish a general causal connection if we are not allowed to ignore the particularities of particular instances. It is, of course, not possible to ignore the particularities in all cases. For example, if an individual, Rāma, is intelligent, because he drinks cow's milk, it will not do to establish a general causal connection between drinking cow's milk and being intelligent. For other factors like heredity, environment etc., of the invididual may be causally relevant.

In this case of qualificative cognition, if we are not allowed to ignore the particularities and find out the common general feature, then there will be no cause of qualificative cognition in general. So qualificative cognition will arise from no cause at all, although all particular instances of qualificative cognition like inference, verbal testimony etc., will have special causes like cognition of the probandum etc.[15]

Then a new important problem arises. A qualificative cognition is the cognition of a relation between two cognized objects, the qualificand and the qualifier. But to cognize a relation, it may be contended, it is necessary to cognize both the terms. Gaṅgeśa's argument here is that a determinate perception which is a qualificative cognition is produced by the cognition of only the qualifier. It may be argued that this cognition is necessary but not sufficient, for to cognize a relation it is necessary to cognize both the terms, the qualificand and also the qualifier. It is interesting to note that Viśvanātha in his *Bhāṣāpariccheda* asserts that in indeterminate perception both the qualificand and the qualifier are cognized, although as unrelated.[16]

*Āloka,* however, refutes this theory. Jayadeva Miśra says that it might be argued that as a relation is determined by both its terms, a cognition of a relation in a qualificative cognition must require the cognition of the qualificand just as much as of the qualifier. The answer is that although a relation is *between* two terms, still it is the second term (*pratiyogin*) which *determines* the relation and not the first term (*anuyogin*). This is enough to explain the meaning of relation words. This becomes clear when we consider such a term as 'colour-possessing' ('coloured'), which produces the cognition of inherence of colour, not of inherence of things which have the colour. If things are the second terms (*pratiyogins*) of inherence, then there would be at times a cognition of thing-possessing colour. This however, never happens: we always cognize colour-possessing things.

But, then, a question arises about contact as a relation. A cognition of contact requires a cognition of both its terms. The solution is that in perceiving two things related by contact it is the cognition of the second term of the relation which must occur prior to the cognition of the relation. The first term of the relation is cognized at the time of perception when it is epistemically related with the sense-organ. This is because contact like two-ness is *vyāsajyavṛtti* which belongs to both, but not to each. So in the cognition of such qualities it is necessary to cognize both the terms. However two-ness is not a relation.[17] Rucidatta, too, in his *Prakāśa*, states the solution, but attributes it to "some Nyāya philosophers".[18]

### 3.1. Another objection and a proposed reply

स्यादेतत् । वह्निमानित्यादिज्ञानं प्रति वह्निज्ञानस्य न विशेषणज्ञानत्वेन कारणता, द्रव्यत्वेन वह्निज्ञानेऽपि वह्निमानिति ज्ञानाभावात् । किं तु विशेषणतावच्छेदकप्रकारकज्ञानत्वेन, अतो न विशिष्टज्ञाने विशेषणज्ञानं हेतुः । विशेषणज्ञानत्वमपि तत्रास्तीति चेत्—न । तस्यातिप्रसक्तत्वात् अन्यथासिद्धेश्च । न च तादृशविशषणज्ञानजन्यत्वं साध्यम्, बाधादिति ।

**Translation :** (Obj) Let it be so. The cause of the cognition of fire in the (inferential) cognition fire-possessing (is the) hill etc. is not a cognition of the qualifier fire, for there is no (inferential) cognition fire-possessing (is the hill) even if fire is cognized as a substance. But the cause is the cognition having the limitor of the qualifierness as the mode; hence cognition of the qualifier is not a cause of qualificative cognition, even though the cognition of the qualifier is there.

**Reply Proposed :** No. This is too wide, and is otherwise established. Moreover, the probandum is not the property—being caused by cognition of such a qualifier, because of opposition.

**Explanation :** Gaṅgeśa has argued that every qualificative cognition of the form a-R-b, where a relation is cognized between a qualificand and a qualifier, is caused by a prior cognition (indeteminate perception) of the qualifier alone. Against this argument of Gaṅgeśa, it is now pointed out that not a cognition of the mere qualifier but a cognition having the limitor of qualifierness as its mode is the cause as in the case of the inferential cognition, (the) hill (is) fire-possessing. This is a qualificative cognition having as its object a qualificand (the hill), a qualifier (fire), and a relation (contact) between them. Here it is necessary to note a fundamental difference between the method of decomposition of a sentence into its subject and predicate terms in traditional Western logic and the Navya-Nyāya method of determining the mode of cognition from a sentence expressing that cognition. The Navya-Nyāya rule can be stated as a rule of the thumb thus :

**Rule N-N.** To determine the mode of a cognition, (i) drop the suffix '—possessing' when it occurs in the sentence expressing the cognition; (ii) add the suffix'—ness' to it when the suffix '—possessing' does not occur. Then the mode of cognition will be the object meant (denoted) by the terms thus modified.

For example, when a cognition is expressed in the sentence '(the) hill (is) fire-possessing' the suffix '—possessing' has to be dropped from 'fire-possessing', so that we have 'fire'. The mode of the cognition is the object fire denoted by 'fire'. So also when another cognition is expressed in the sentence 'this (is) fire', there is no word with the suffix '—possessing'. So we have to add the suffix '—ness' to 'fire' to get 'fire-ness'. The mode of the cognition is the universal fire-ness which is the object meant by 'fireness'. All this has the effect of making 'have' the copula, not 'be' as in traditional Western logic. Thus the sentence '(the) hill is fire-possessing' will be transformed into 'the hill has fire' where fire (not 'fire') will be the mode. The sentence 'this is fire' will be transformed into 'this has fire-ness', where fire-ness (not 'fire-ness') will be the mode.

In the example under consideration we have the word 'fire-possessing', so the mode or the qualifier is fire. Yet to infer that something (for example, the hill) is fire-possessing, we have to cognize fire which is the qualifier in the cognition, under a higher, second-order qualifer, fire-ness. Only when someone has cognized fire *as* fire, i.e., as an instance of the universal fire-ness, can he infer fire on the hill. If someone has cognized fire *as* a substance, i.e., as an instance of the universal substance-hood, he cannot infer fire on the hill, although he has cognized fire, which is the qualifier in the inference. This shows that mere cognition of the qualifier does not suffice for a qualificative cognition having that qualifier. What is necessary is that the qualifier has to be cognized under a higher mode—the limitor of the qualifierness—which will be the mode of the cognition. Thus in order to be able to infer fire-possessing (is the hill), it is necessary to cognize the qualifier fire under the higher mode fire-ness. Hence the cognition having the limitor of qualifierness as the mode is the cause of the cognition having the qualifier. So a cognition of the mere qualifier is not a cause of the corresponding qualificative cognition.

Now when one cognizes fire under the higher qualifier fire-ness, one has the cognition of fire, too, which is the qualifier in the cognition, fire-possessing (is the hill). So even though the cognition of the qualifier is there, still it is not the cause of the qualificative cognition.

The suggested reply (not accepted by Gaṅgeśa) is that this theory cannot be accepted. For, as has been pointed out by the opponent himself, even though fire is cognized under the higher order qualifier, substance-hood, there is no qualificative cognition, fire-possessing, resulting from it. It will not do to say that only when fire is cognized under the higher order qualifier fireness, then the qualificative cognition, fire-possessing, results. For the opponent cannot say that *any* cognition involving a second-order qualifier is the cause of a qualificative cognition. Thus the opponent's theory suffers from the defect of over-extension, as it does apply to the case of cognition with the higher order qualifier substance-hood although it is not the cause of the qualificative cognition of fire-possessing.

The second objection to the opponent's position suggested by some Navya-Nyāya philosophers is that the cognition with the higher order qualifier—i.e., the cognition of the qualifier of the qualifier (this is technically called 'cognition of the limitor of the qualifierness'[19]) is not a cause of the qualificative cognition having the qualifier, but is a cause of the cause of such cognition. Cognition of fireness produces the cognition of fire, for fireness is the qualifier of the cognition of fire; cognition of fire, then, produces the cognition of fire-possessing. So cognition of fireness is the cause of the cause of the cognition of fire-possessing. Now a cause of a cause of A is not a cause of A. The cause of the cause is technically called 'otherwise established'.

A further objection to the opponent's theory is advanced. The opponent has argued that the qualifier has to be cognized under the mode of a higher order qualifier. And this cognition of the qualifier so qualified is the cause of qualificative cognition. Now the objection is that even when we know that the qualifier cannot be qualified by a higher order qualifier, we have qualificative cognition. For example, when we have qualificative cognition of fire, fireness, which is a universal, becomes the qualifier. Now the Navya-Nyāya theory is that if a universal is not denoted by a word, then it is cognized in and through itself and not through any higher order qualifier. When we have a qualificative cognition of fire, fireness is not denoted by any word. So fireness, the qualifier, is cognized in and through itself. Hence, in this case we have cognition that the qualifier (fireness) cannot be qualified by a higher order qualifier. This cognition acts as an impediment to the cognition that a qualified qualifier is the cause of qualificative cognition.

### 3.11 Gaṅgeśa's position

तन्न । विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यज्ञानं प्रति हि विशेषणतावच्छेदकप्रकारकं ज्ञानं कारणमुभयसिद्धम् । अतो विशिष्टज्ञानमात्रं प्रति विशेषणज्ञानं हेतुः । यद्विशेषयोः कार्यकारणभावस्तत्सामान्ययोरपि बाधकं विना कार्यकारणभावनियमात्, अन्यथा सामान्यकार्योच्छेदः । न चातिप्रसङ्गः, विशेषसामग्रीविरहेण तत्तत्कार्यविशेषानुदयात् । न च परोक्षत्वमुपाधिः । प्रत्यभिज्ञायां साध्याव्यापकत्वात् । नापि विशिष्टविशेषणकत्वं, पक्षेतरत्वादिति ।

**Translation :** That is not (correct). Both (of us) agree that cognition having the limitor of qualifierness as the qualifier is the cause of qualified qualificative cognition. So cognition of the qualifier is the cause of merely qualified cognition. A causal connection which holds between specifically characterized objects also holds between those objects generally (without specific characters), if (of course) there is no impediment. Otherwise, there would be no general causal connection. This would not lead to too wide application; no specifically characterized effect can be produced without the corresponding, specifically characterized cause. And indirectness is not an imposed property; for there is no pervasion of the probandum in recognition. It is also not a cognition of a qualified qualifier, for this is other than the locus of the inference.

**Explanation :** Now Gaṅgeśa gives his reason for rejecting the opponent's theory and also the proposed reply. Qualificative cognition can be simple or complex. For example, when we cognize someone as stick-possessing (as holding a stick in his hand), the stick is the qualifier. But when we cognize someone as (red-stick)-possessing, the cognition becomes more complex. First of all, red is the qualifier of the stick, and then this qualified qualifier (the red stick) qualifies the man. The cognition of a red stick is the cause of this doubly qualified cognition. For any one who does not cognize a red stick cannot cognize someone as having it. Now in the cognition of a red stick, i.e., a stick as red, red colour becomes the qualifier of the qualifier (the red stick) of the qualificand, the man. As the cognition of a qualifier is technically called the cognition of the limitor of qualifierness, the cause of such a complex cognition is the cognition having the limitor of the qualifierness (resident in the stick which is the qualifier of the man) as its mode (the red colour is the mode or qualifier of the cognition of a red stick). Now this much is agreed between the opponent and Gaṅgeśa.

Now Gaṅgeśa argues that for a simple qualificative cognition, it is the cognition of the qualifier which is the cause. In support of this theory Gaṅgeśa explains how general causal connections are established from particular cases. In all particular cases of causal connections, the causes are special causes. For example, from red threads a red cloth is produced, from blue threads a blue cloth is produced and so on. In every particular case, threads will have some colour (or variegated colours) to produce a cloth of a special colour. But the general causal relation is established on the basis of the special causal connections—threads are causes of a cloth. Now it cannot be argued that there are no threads without colours, and that therefore we can have only threads with specific colours. Now if from these specifically coloured threads we do not establish a general connection between threads and cloth, we cannot have any general causal relation. Gaṅgeśa, of course, admits that this sort of general causal relation cannot always be established from specific causal relations; there may be cases where specific qualities cannot be ignored to establish general causal relations. So he explicitly excludes such cases, where ignoring of specific qualities is prevented.

Conversely, a general causal connection cannot explain specific ones; to explain causal connections of particular cases, causes have to be specified corresponding to specified effects. Jayadeva Miśra in his *Āloka* makes this point explicit. He says that the theory that a cognition of the qualifier is a cause of a qualificative cognition is based on the theory that relations are determined only by their second terms, and not also by their first terms. As the second term of a relation becomes the qualifier in the cognition of the relation, it is the cognition of the qualifier which is a cause of the qualificative cognition. Otherwise, in the inference establishing indeterminate perception, the probans, being qualificative cognition, will not be valid.

There is a second point which Jayadeva Miśra makes here. If the general causal relation between cognition of the qualifier and qualificative cognition suffices, then there is no need to postulate a special causal relation to explain the more complicated qualified qualificative cognition. Gaṅgeśa and his opponent have agreed that cognition of the limitor of qualifierness as the mode (i.e., cognition of the qualifier of the qualifier of the qualificand) is a cause of qualified qualificative cognition. But Jayadeva Miśra points out that even this special case of cognition can be explained by the general causal relation. For example, when we cognize that fireness-qualified-fire qualifies a hill, then we have first to cognize fireness-qualified fire, which is a case of simple qualificative cognition where the cognition of fireness is a cause. Then, there is the cognition of fire as the qualifier of the hill. Thus if we analyse the complex qualified qualificative cognition of fireness-qualified-fire-qualified hill, then we do not have to assume a special causal relation to explan it. If we analyse the complex qualificative cognition in two simpler qualificative cognitions, then we can explain why if fire is cognized as a substance (substance-hood is the mode of the cognition, the limitor of the qualifierness) we do not have the qualificative cognition of fire-possessing hill : as we do not have here the first qualificative cognition that fireness qualifies fire, we do not have the effect, i.e., the second cognition of fire qualifying the hill.

Now the question is: why should the more complicated qualified qualificative cognition be analysed into simpler qualificative cognitions to find its cause ? The reply given by Jayadeva Miśra uses the Navya-Nyāya theory of the nature of limiting properties. When a causal relation holds between a cause and its effect, the cause becomes the cause only under some specific property; this mode is technically called 'the limiting property of causeness resident in the cause'. So also there is a limiting property of effectness resident in the effect. Now the Navya-Nyāya theory is that these limiting properties in general, and of causeness and effectness in particular, cannot be complex or compound properties. For example, if a blue lotus is a cause of, say, its perception, then the limiting property of causeness is not blue-lotus-ness, but two separate qualities, blue colour and lotusness. So also in the case of the more complex qualified qualificative cognition, the limiting property of effectness is not the property—being qualified qualificative cognition—for the property is a complex property; the limiting property of causeness in this case is not the complex propetrty—being the cognition having the limiting property of qualifierness as its mode. Thus to fix the limiting property of causeness and effectness of the complex cognition, the cognition has to be analysed.[20]

Now Rucidatta in his *Prakāśa* gives a different explanation. He says that the opponent might argue that although the collection of two causes of simple qualificative cognitions may explain how the complex qualified qualificative cognition may originate, still that cannot be the limiting property of effectness as it is a composite property like blue-lotusness; nor is the limiting property of effectness the property, being a cognition having the limitor of qualifierness as its mode. That is, what Jayadeva Miśra offers as the solution, Rucidatta regards as the opponent's position. Rucidatta's solution is that this explanation of the complex qualified qualificative cognition being caused by the collection of two simple qualificative cognitions is not acceptable for it does not apply to the visual perception of a piece of sandal wood as fragrant, although this perception is an instance of qualified qualificative cognition. The point is that we visually perceive a piece of sandal wood as fragrant; this perception cannot be explained as the visual perception of the piece of sandal wood and the recollection of fragrance from memory. According to Navya-Nyāya it is one piece of cognition and the introspective evidence is that it is a visual perception. To explain this sort of special perception which everyone has, Navya-Nyāya develops a new theory of epistemological relation (*sannikarṣa*) of a special sort. The explanation why this complex qualified qualificative visual perception cannot be regarded as the collection of two simple qualificative perceptions is that the cause of qualificative cognition is not merely the cognition of the qualifier, but involves also the sense-organ-object contact with the perceptible qualifier. As fragrance cannot be perceived by the eye, there cannot be two simpler qualificative visual cognitions—This is a piece of sandal wood and this is fragrant.[21]

This explanation which Rucidatta offers here goes beyond what Gaṅgeśa has said. According to Gaṅgeśa a qualificative cognition is caused by a cognition of the qualifier, he has not (yet) mentioned that the qualifier has to be perceptible by the relevant sense-organ.

Then Gaṅgeśa meets another objection. It may be argued that in the (determinate) perception of (the) cow, there is an imposed property of indirect cognition. So the inference that the (determinate) perception of the cow is caused by a cognition of the qualifier (cowness) because the perception is a qualificative cognition is invalid. Here the locus of the inference is the (determinate) perception of the cow, the probandum is, being caused by a cognition of the qualifier, and the probans is, being a qualificative cognition. To be valid, the inference must be based on a universal relation of pervasion of the probans by the probandum. This means that every object to which the probans is related by the relevant relation is also the locus of the probandum. The probandum pervades the probans, if the inference is valid. Now one method of recognizing whether the probandum really pervades the probans is to find out whether there is any imposed property. This means that if there is anything which pervades the probandum, but does not pervade the probans, then the probandum does not pervade the probans. This is because the transitivity of pervasion does not hold in this case. If *A* pervades *B*, and *B* pervades *C*, then *A* pervades *C*. It follows, then, that if *A* pervades *B* but does not pervade *C*, then *B* does not pervade *C*. *A* is the imposed property, *B* is the probandum, and *C* the probans. Now, in the present case, the argument of the opponent is that the inference, given by Gaṅgeśa, that the (determinate) perception of (the) cow is caused by the cognition of the qualifier (cowness), because of being a qualificative cognition, is not valid; for, between the probandum (being caused by the cognition of the qualifier) and the probans (being a qualificative cognition) there is the imposed property, being an indirect cognition. The opponent's point is that whatever is caused by a cognition of the qualifier is an indirect cognition, yet every qualificative cognition is not an indirect cognition. This means that being an indirect cognition (*A*) pervades the probandum (*B*) but does not pervade the probans (*C*). So the probandum does not pervade the probans, and the inference is invalid.

Gaṅgeśa's reply to this objection is that it is not true that being an indirect cognition pervades the probandum. Although it is sometimes true, as in the case of the cognition of the conclusion of an inference, that the cognition caused by the cognition of the qualifier is also an indirect cognition, still this does not hold in all cases. When we infer that (the) hill (is) fire-possessing, this inferential cognition is caused by the prior cognition of fire, and this inferential cognition is an indirect cognition. But in the case of recognition this does not hold. In recognition of the form 'This is that Devadatta' the that-ness is the qualifier of Devadatta, and the recognition is caused by the cognition of this qualifier. Anyone who had not known Devadatta previously would not be able to re-identify him as that person. So the recognition is caused by the cognition of the qualifier (that-ness), yet recognition is not an indirect cognition but is a kind of perception which is direct cognition. So it is not true that whatever cognition is caused by the cognition of the qualifier is indirect cognition. This means that *A* does not pervade *B* . So *A* (indirect cognition) does not pervade the probandum. Hence the objection of the opponent is not tenable.

It should be noted here that according to Gaṅgeśa the cognition of the qualifier (that-ness) in recognition is memory and is hence indirect cognition.[22] But this does not mean that the recognition is memory; it is a direct cognition. This follows from Gaṅgeśa's second definition of perception as given earlier: perception is that cognition which does not have another cognition as its instrumental cause. This definition of perception does not preclude the possiblity that some other cognition (often memory which is an indirect cognition) is a cause of perception; only that cause must not be the instrumental cause. So in recognition memory plays a causal role, but it is not the role of the instrumental cause.

*Prakāśa* raises one more point. The probandum of the inference is, being caused by the cognition of the qualifier.

But even the destruction of the cognition of the qualifier is caused by this cognition. For if an object (thing or anything cognized) is destroyed, that object is the cause of its own destruction. If the object were not there, it could not have been destroyed. So the cognition of the qualifier causes its own destruction. But this is not the probandum. So also the introspective perception of the cognition of the qualifier is caused by its cognition, for the object of perception (outer or inner) is a cause of the perception. Again this introspective cognition is not the probandum. So how can the probandum be, being caused by a cognition of the qualifier ?

The reply to this objection is that the probandum is—being caused by a cognition of the qualifier except introspection and that what is caused must be a positive object (destruction being a negative object—the object destroyed is no more). Another reply which may be suggested is that the probandum is—being caused by a cognition of the qualifier *qua* the cognition of the qualifier. Then destruction of the cognition would be ruled out, for as explained earlier any *object* destroyed is the cause of its destruction. So the cognition of the qualifier causes its own destruction not *qua* cognition, but *qua* object. So also introspection is caused by the object of introspection. This reply excludes both destruction and introspection of the cognition of the qualifier from being included in the probandum.

Rucidatta, however, does not accept this reply as correct. For, according to him, if the probandum be, being caused by a cognition of the qualifier *qua* cognition of the qualifier, then in many cases the probandum would not be available. For example, cognition of an inferential conclusion is caused by a cognition of the qualifier, but not *qua* cognition of the qualifier, but as cognition of pervasion. So the suggested reply does not solve the difficulty.[23]

Gaṅgeśa then answers another objection. It may be argued that the locus of the inference is not the (determinate) perception of (the) cow, but is a cognition with a qualified qualifier. Gańgeśa's reply is that, in that case, the cognition of the qualified qualifier will be different from the locus of the inference. In some cases the opponent's position holds, but not in all cases. For example, in the case of the (determinate) perception of (someone as) stick-possessing the stick is the qualifier. But the stick being a substance cannot be cognized in and through itself; it must be cognized through a qualifier, stickness, which is a universal, and not being denoted by a word, is cognized in and through itself. So in this case, the perception, which is the locus of the inference, is of a qualified qualifier (stickness qualifying the stick which is the qualifer). Gańgeśa can easily refute this contention, for in the inference, the locus of the inference is the (determinate) perception of the cow. The qualifier of this perception is cowness, which is a universal not denoted by any word and is cognized in and through itself. Thus in the inference actually given by Gangesa the locus is not a cognition of a qualified qualifier.

### 4.1. An objection to Gańgeśa's positon

**मैवम् । तवापि स्मृतिवत्पूर्वानुभवस्य संस्कारद्वारा जनकत्वात् सिद्धसाधनात् । न चाव्यवहितविशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वं साध्यम्, अप्रयोजकत्वात् प्रत्यभिज्ञावत् स्मृत्यैवोपपत्तेर्वा । नापि तत एवाव्यवहितविशेषणानुभवजन्यत्त्वं साध्यम्, अप्रसिद्धेः प्रत्यभिज्ञानादौ व्यभिचाराच्च ।**

**Translation :** This is not so. On your theory, too, earlier informative cognition, through its memory traces, causes (the qualificative cognition) just as memory does, and hence the inference commits the fallacy of establishing what is already established. The probandum cannot also be (said to be)—being caused by immediately preceding cognition of the qualifier—for it is not a cause, or it can be explained by memory as in the case of recognition. Nor also is the probandum — being caused by immediately preceding informative cognition of the qualifier; for such a probandum is not known, and also it is not applicable to recognition etc.

**Explanation :** Here the opponent points out another difficulty in the inference by which indeterminate perception is proved. The probandum of the inference is—being caused by a cognition of the qualifier. Now the opponent points out that this probandum is already proved on Gaṅgeśa's theory. The (determinate) perception of the cow requires the prior cognition of cowness. This prior cognition can be memory; or it can also be the earlier experience of a cow. Although the earlier experience is dead, it is not gone; for it has left its memory trace in the self. So just as one can say that the recollection of cowness is the cause of the perception of the cow as a cow, so one may also say that it is the earlier experience which causes the determinate perception by means of its memory traces. But, then, there is no point in trying to prove that the determinate perception of the cow is caused by earlier cognition of cowness, for that is already admitted by Gaṅgeśa.

If to avoid this difficulty the probandum is changed into, being caused by an immediately preceding cognition of the qualifier, even then the situation does not improve. Now the difficulty is that this changed probandum does not state the causal law correctly. For an immediately preceding cognition of the qualifier is not always present in a qualificative cognition. For example, in the case of recognition, one might have perceived Devadatta long before, but when one sees him now, he recognizes him as the person whom he saw earlier. According to Nyāya, this recognition takes the from 'This is that Devaddatta'. In this cognition which is qualificative, that-ness is the qualifier of Devadatta, but that-ness was cognized long before. It is not a cognition which immediately precedes the recognition. As we have already mentioned, Rucidatta asserts that according to Gaṅgeśa, it is the memory of that-ness, an indirect cognition, which is the cause of recognition.

So this cognition of the qualifier (that-ness), is not an immediately preceding cognition. As a matter of fact, only when one sees Devadatta now, one remembers that this is the same person as he who was seen before. So the memory cognition comes before the recognition, but only after seeing Devadatta.

Another way of avoiding the charge of proving what is already proved is to change the probandum into—being caused by immediately preceding informative cognition of the qualifier. But this way, too, does not lead to a solution of the difficulty. For now the new probandum is never found.

Rucidatta, however,points out that in special cases of determinate perception, an immediately preceding perception of the qualifier is available (perception is informative cognition). He gives the example of the perception of someone holding a stick in his hand. The perceptual cognition is of the form—(the) stick- possessor ; in this perception the qualifier, the stick, is first perceived immediately before the perception of the stick-possessor. So the type of case is not altogether impossible. That is why, Rucidatta says, the opponent gives the other reason. This is, again, to cite the example of recognition where there is no immediately preceding *cognition* of the qualifier as its cause, hence, a *forteriori* no immediately preceding *informative cognition.*[24]

### 5.1 An argument for indeterminate perception and a reply by Mīmāṁsakas in support of Nyāya.

अथ तत्कालोत्पन्नरूपादिविशिष्टप्रत्यक्षे संस्काराभावेन स्मरणाभावात् पक्षधर्मताबलेन निर्विकल्पकसिद्धौ अन्यत्रापि सामग्रीतौल्यात्तत्सिद्धिरिति चेत्—न । प्रत्युत्पन्नविशेषणस्थले हि शुक्लत्वादिविशिष्टशुक्लवैशिष्ट्यबोधो वा अविशिष्टतद्विशिष्टबोधो वा, आद्ये शुक्लत्वादिस्मरणं प्रथमम्, ततः प्रत्यक्षेण तद्विशिष्टशुक्लबोधः, ततः

शुक्लत्वादिविशिष्ट शुक्लादिवैशिष्ट्यबोधः द्रव्य इति किमनुपपन्नम् । शुक्लत्वादिजातिस्मरणमेव वा सामान्यलक्षणया सकलरूपादिविषयमस्तु । द्वितीयेऽननुभवः। न हि शुक्लत्वादिप्रत्ययविलक्षणं शुक्लरूपादिविशिष्टबोधं कश्चिदनुभवति ।

**Translation (Opponent)** Then in the case of perception of colour which has come into existence at that moment, there cannot be any memory for there cannot be any memory trace of it. So on the strength of the presence of the probans (in the locus of inference) indeterminate perception is proved. In other cases, too,as all the causal factors remain the same, so indeterminate perception is proved.

**Reply :** This is not (cannot be) so. In the case of qualifiers which have just come into existence, there are two alternatives—either (i) there is cognition of white colour qualified by whiteness. Or (ii) the cognition is not being qualified by whiteness. In case (i), first there is memory of whiteness, then by perception there is the cognition of white colour qualified by that. Next there is cognition of white colour qualified by whiteness in a substance. What is the difficulty here ? There may be memory of the universal whiteness, or there may be a peculiar perception of all white colours by a peculiar sense-organ contact through the universal. In case (ii) no one can have this type of informative cognition. No one has the introspection of a cognition of a substance qualified by white colour without a cognition of whiteness.

**Explanation :** An argument for postulating indeterminate peroception is given. The Mīmāṁsakas refute this argument. First we explain the argument. This argument is in two stages. (i) Firstly, it is a qualified perception of a very special kind of object. According to Nyāya, qualities like colour, taste etc., are as particular as the things which have them. These qualities, again, are caused by these things. If they were not there, the particular qualities could not come into being. Now, suppose a colour particular has just been brought into existence as belonging to a particular thing. The perception of this colour just at that moment will be a determinate cognition of the colour qualifying the thing. So the colour will be the qualifier of this qualificative cognition. But that would be impossible without a prior cognition of the qualifier. As the colour particular has just come into being it could not have been perceived before, and so there can be no memory of it in the absence of any trace left by an earlier experience. Yet because the perception is a qualificative cognition (which is the probans in the argument given by Gaṅgeśa), and this probans is present in this determinate perception of the colour qualifying the thing, indeterminate perception of the colour is proved. (ii) In the second stage, the argument generalizes from this particular special case. As all the causal conditions in other cases are exactly similar to those which hold in this special case, indeterminate perception of the qualifier as the cause of qualificative cognition is proved in all cases.

The Mīmāṁsakas refute this argument on behalf of Nyāya. In the special case of qualities just produced there are two types of possible qualificative cognitions: either (i) the qualificative cognition is of a thing possessing white colour qualified by whiteness; or (ii) of a thing possessing white colour without being qualified by whiteness. In both cases the white colour is the qualifier of the cognition. Now the Mīmāṁsakas argue that in case of qualificative cognition in case (i), there is first memory of whiteness, then there is the qualificative cognition of white colour qualified by whiteness, and then there is the cognition of the relation of whiteness-qualified-white-colour to the thing. What is the difficulty here ?. Whiteness is the qualifier of the white colour in the qualificative cognition of whiteness-qualified-white-colour. The qualifier being a universal is cognized (remembered) in and through itself prior to the qualificative cognition which therefore, is caused by this indeterminate cognition of the qualifier.

The Mīmāṁsakas, then, use the Nyāya theory and point out that instead of memory of the universal whiteness, the Nyāya philosopher may hold that all colours past, present, and future, near and distant, are perceived as colour through the cognition of the univrsal. Perception requires a relation of the sense organ to the objects perceived. Now ordinary relations of sense-organs cannot relate them to past or future objects, or to distant objects which are not present. So a special type of relation of the sense-organ to such objects is postulated. It is the cognition of the universal which is present (inheres) in all its instances, past, present, future, near and distant, which produces the special type of perception of all the instances of a universal, just as instances. No one can perceive all particular instances as particular instances. But even this very special type of relation of the sense-organ to all particulars (which everyone has) requires the cognition of the universal, which cognition relates the sense-organ to all instances. So the cognition of the universal is necessary even in this case. Only the causal connection is indirect.[25]

Rucidatta here points out that the Mīmāṁsakas do not admit universals in the sense of Nyāya (*jāti* ). As the argument here is refuted by the Mīmāṁsakas, it is not proper for them to use a Nyāya concept in the refutation. Rucidatta, therefore, explains that this concept of the universal has been used by the Mīmāṁsakas because they are supporting the Nyāya view.[26] In case (ii) no one has introspective evidence that one has the cognition of a thing qualified by white colour without cognizing whiteness. The point is that only universals are cognized in and through themselves, without any modes or qualifiers. But the colour particular is not a universal; so it cannot be cognized in and through itself without being cognized under the mode of the universal of colour.

## 6.1. Another argument for indeterminate perception and its criticism

अथ जागराद्यविशिष्टानुभवो विशेषणज्ञानजन्यो विशिष्टज्ञानत्वात् । न च तत्र संस्कारद्वारा पुर्वविशेषणानुभवः तज्जन्यविशेषणस्मरणं वा तत्र संभवति । उद्बोधकं विना संस्कारस्य स्मरणे विशिष्टबोधे वा सामर्थ्याभावादित्युद्बोधकं वक्तव्यम् । उद्बोधकं चान्यत्र ज्ञानं दृष्टमिति तदेव वाच्यम् । न च तद्विशिष्टज्ञानमेव, तत्रापि विशेषणज्ञानापेक्षायामनवस्थापत्तेरित्यालोचनसिद्धिरिति । तन्न । सत्यपि ज्ञाने संस्कारानुद्बोधात् । यस्मात् फलं भवति स ज्ञानविशेषस्तथेति चेत्—न । अननुगतत्वात् । यदनन्तरं फलं दृश्यते तदेवाननुगतमप्युद्बोधकं कल्प्यते फलबलादिति चेत्—तर्हि जागरकारणानन्तरं संस्कारोद्बोधोऽस्तीति तदेव कारणमस्तु, क्लृप्तत्वात् । अत एव संस्कारोद्बोधे न नियतो हेतुरिति ।

'सदृशादृष्टचिन्ताद्याः स्मृति (जीवस्य) बीजस्य बोधका' इत्याहुः ।

एवं च प्रणिधानादिसूत्रमपि संगच्छते ।

अपि च विशिष्टज्ञानत्वादित्यत्र व्यवच्छेद्यमविशिष्टज्ञानम् । तच्चाप्रसिद्धम् । सिद्धौ वा व्यर्थमनुमानम्। ज्ञानत्वं च स्वतोऽसिद्धव्याप्तिकं निर्विकल्पके व्यभिचारादनवस्थापाताच्च ।

**Translation :** Then the qualificative cognition which one has on the first moment on waking from sleep is caused by a cognition of the qualifier as it is a case of qualificative cognition. It is not also possible that the cognition of the qualifier is due to an earlier experience working through its memory trace, or to its memory traces which are not capable of producing memory or qualificative cognition without something exciting them. Hence the exciting factors of memory traces have to be stated. Elsewhere, it has been seen that a cognition is the excitor; so, here, too, that is the excitor. That cognition (which excites memory traces) is not a qualificative cognition, for, that would also require a cognition of its qualifier and so on ad infinitum. So is proved the existence of indeterminate perception.

This is not so. Even if a cognition is there, it may not excite the memory traces. It may be replied that what produces the result (the excitation) is, indeed, some cognition. But this is not correct. For there will be no general property common to these cognitions which function as excitors. It may be replied, that immediately after which the result is seen is to be regarded as the excitor on the basis of the result even though there are no general common properties. Then let the factors which awaken the person themselves be regarded as excitors as the memory traces are excited immediately on waking. Moreover, the causal factors which awaken the person have to be postulated. Hence there is no uniform cause of excitation of memory traces.

'Cognition of similarity, *adṛṣṭa;* thinking etc. are the excitors'

It is said.

The assumption that there is no uniform cause of excitation also explains the *sūtra* beginning with 'attentive awareness'.

Moreover, in 'being qualificative cognition', what is excluded is non-qualificative cognition. But this is not established. Even if it be established, then the inference is pointless. Mere cognition-ness, is by itself non-pervasive, because of deviation with respect to indeterminate cognition and also because of infinite regress.

**Explanation :** Here another agrument for postulating indeterminate perception is given. This is not Gaṅgeśa's argument. The argument is based on our awareness juṣt on waking from deep sleep. At the first moment of being awake, we have qualificative cognition of something. Now this qualificative cognition is caused by a cognition of the qualifier. This cognition cannot be memory, for there was no possibility of any earlier experience, and therefore no possibility of any memory trace. So there cannot be any memory of the object at that moment.

Now if there were any memory traces, they had to be activated in order to produce memory cognition. So it is necessary to state the causal factors which activate the memory traces. For the memory traces being unconscious themselves cannot produce either memory or qualificative cognition without being activated. Now what activates memory traces is some cognition. For example, if I see, remember, infer, or otherwise cognize, an object which is similar to an object which I had cognized before, then this cognition of similarity would activate the memory traces, and I would recall the past experience. So, in this case, too, the factors which activate the memory traces are cognitions. Now those cognitions, again, cannot be qualificative cognitions which would require cognitions of their qualifiers and so on ad infinitum. So the cognition which activates the memory of the qualifier at the time of waking, has to be indeterminate cognition. Thus indeterminate cognition is proved.

**Objection :** That is not correct. For example, even when a cognition is there, this may not activate the trace. The point is that cognition of similarity may, and often does, activate memory traces but there is no law that it must activate them. So even if cognition of similarity is present, it may not activate the memory traces.

Jayadeva Miśra, however, interprets this objection differently. According to him this is Gaṅgeśa's objection. Gaṅgeśa himself is criticising the argument that at the moment of waking we have qualificative perception caused by indeterminate cognition of the qualifier. Now if at that moment cowness is perceived in a special way by being brought before consciousness (*saṁskāropanīta*) by memory traces, then just as in recognition where we have the cognition of that-ness (this is that Devadatta), so also in this case, too, we ought to have cognition of that-ness (that cowness); for what (cognition) is caused by memory traces also causes mentioning of that-ness. The point is that when memory traces are causally operative, they produce cognition which involves memory or at least recognition of an object seen in the past. We then have at least a recognition that this is that object. But we do not have any cognition of this form in indeterminate perception. So Jayadeva Miśra says that Gaṅgeśa gives here further reasons in the next section.[27]

**Reply :** Well whatever activates memory traces is some cognition or other.

**Objection :** This is not so. For if different types of cognition activate the trace on different occasions, then there will be no properties common to all of these cognitions. Yet all these properties produce the same result, i.e., activate the same memory trace. According to Nyāya if at different times, on different occasions, one result is produced by different causes, then these different causes must have something common to produce the same result.

**Reply :** Even if there is no common property shared by all the different causes, still if the result takes place after something, then that something ought to be regatrded as activating the memory trace. This something may be different on different occasions; still as it does produce the result, it has to be regarded as activating the trace.

**Objection :** Then there is no need to assume this extra something as the cause of excitation of traces. For when one wakes up from sleep, there must have been some cause to make one wake up. And immediately afterwards one has the memory of the qualifier as a result of activated traces. So why not identify the causes of waking with those which activate the traces ? This has the merit of being a simpler explanation, for causes for waking have to be postulated.

But this will lead to the theory that there are no uniform causes of activating traces, for the causes which make one wake up are very different on different occasions. Now this is what is exactly stated in the following verse.

The causes which activate memory traces are cognition of similarity, *adṛṣṭa,* intense thinking etc.

This is the opinion of the opponent.

This theory that there is no uniform cause of activating traces also explains the *Yogasūtra* for concentrated awareness. It is stated there that constant unbroken parctice makes the traces firmly imprinted in the mind (self). This is really the law of exercise—repetition tends to make traces firm. This also shows that there is no uniform factor activating memory traces.[28]

The point at issue is this. Gaṅgeśa has argued for indeterminate perception by showing that a determinate perception of the cow is caused by a cognition of the qualifier, (which cognition cannot be a determinate cognition) because it (the determinate perception) is a qualified cognition. Now the probans, being a qualificative cognition, excludes non-qualificative cognition, i.e., indeterminate perception. But to exclude it, it must be proved to exist, for what does not exist cannot be excluded. Yet it is not yet proved. The argument, if valid, will prove it. If, however, indeterminate perception is already established, then the argument to prove it becomes useless. Thus, there is a dilemma; the probans, being a qualificative cognition, excludes indeterminate perception, which is either unproved or proved. In the first case, the argument is invalid; in the second case, it is useless.

Now, if in order to avoid this dilemma, it is replied that the probans is not, being a qualificative cognition, but is simply, being a cognition (cognitionness), then the argument becomes invalid. Because the probans, cognition-ness will be present even in indeterminate perception where the probandum, being caused by a cognition of the qualifier, is absent. So the probans suffers from the defect of deviation. If the probans is present in a locus of absence of the probandum, the probans is said to deviate from the probandum.

Moreover, this probans will lead to infinite regress. For if every cognition has to be caused by a cognition of the qualifier, then *this* cognition, too, has to be so caused, and so on ad infinitum.

There are two types of infinite regress. One type is validly established by a means of valid cognition; for example, an effect is caused by a cause which, in its turn, is caused by another cause, and so on. This infinite regress is valid. This is the position of the opponent. The reply here is that this infinite regress does not mean that the effect is always happening. It means that the effect takes place only at times when the cause precedes it. So the accidental happening of the effect is due only to the accidental happening of the cause. So the succession of causes and effects is really the succesion of accidentally occurring causes. But in the present case of cognitions causing cognitions, all cognitons are caused by cognitions. This means that there is an unbroken chain of cognitions But as this implies inexplicability of death, this infinite regress is not valid. There is, thus, a contrary *tarka* against this infinite regress. Hence we cannot say that every cognition is caused by a cognition, but only that every qualificative cognition is caused by a cognition. Hence the qualifier 'qualificative' is necessary.

So another defect is here stated. It is stated that in that case in the determinate cognition, 'the cow', the qualification is the qualifier. Jayadeva Miśra says, the this objection is based on the assumption that the objects of a qualificative cognition are the qualificand and the qualifier, and nothing else (i.e., not the qualification).

### 7.1. Difficulty of defining qualificative cognition

किं च विशिष्टज्ञानत्वं न तावत् वस्तुगत्या विशेषणविशेष्यविषयकज्ञानत्वम् आलोचनेन व्यभिचारात् । नापि विशेषणत्वविषयकत्वम् । अतद्व्यावृत्तिबोधजनकज्ञानविषयत्वस्य विशेषणत्वस्य तत्राप्रकाशत् । नापि वैशिष्ट्यविषयकज्ञानत्वम् । तथा सति गौरिति विकल्पे वैशिष्ट्यं विशेषणमित्यालोचनस्यापि तद्विषयत्वेन विशिष्टज्ञानत्वे अनवस्थापातादिति ।

**Translation :** Moreover, qualificative cognition is not, then, a cognition having as its object a qualificand and a qualifier as a matter of fact; for this would overextend to the case of indeterminate perception. Not also is it having qualifierness as its object. For qualifierness is objecthood which produces cognition of distinction from what is not that, and this qualifierness is not cognized in qualificative cognition. Nor is it cognition having qualification as its object. If this were so then in the determinate perception of the cow the qualification would be the qualifier ; even in indeterminate perception having that as its object, there would be infinite regress in qualificative cognition.

**Explanation :** Here three different definitions of qualificative cognition are stated and examined. They are all shown to be inadequate. The examination of these definitions is from the standpoint of Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā, which I shall explain now.

According to this school of Mīmāṁsā, there are two types of perception — *savikalpa* and *avikalpa* or *nirvikalpa*, as in Gaṅgeśa.[29]

The commentator Jaipuri Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa in his

*Nyāyasiddhi* explains : "The term 'vikalpa' means a distinguishing quality, *jāti* etc. '*Savikalpa*' means that which has these qualities. That devoid of *jātis,* is stated in language in five ways such as—this is a jar, this is white, Gautama is going, this is Devadatta, this is a stick-possessor. These are all determinate, qualificative cognitions. The term 'avikalpa' means that from which *vikalpa* has been removed, ie., *nirvikalpaka.*[30]

Then Śālikānātha states that in *nirvikalpaka* perception, not merely the thing or universals are objects. For it is introspectively evident that the difference of objects is also cognized.[31]

The commentator here explains how the difference of an object (from others) can be cognized in *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* (indeterminate perception). According to this school of Mīmāṁsā, there are two different concepts of difference (*bheda*) Difference, again, has to be different from what is different. Difference as a property must be different from that which has this property, i.e., from the object .which is different. Thus there will be infinite regress. (ii) Everything, by its very nature, is different from everything else. This difference (from everything else) is the very nature of evey object. It is not a property, but is the thing itself. So to know this difference which is the very nature of everything it is not necessary to know the counterpositive.

It may be objected here that we cannot know difference, unless we know the difference from *what*. The reply is that this difference which is the very nature of an object can be known without knowing those from which it is different. It is only when one wants to use language in order to communicate this known difference, that one has to mention the counterpositive.[32]

Then Śālikānātha says that at the first stage perception of both common and special features takes place. But to know the common features as common to others and the special features as special features it is necessary to know other objects and to compare them. But at the first stage of perception, which is indeterminate, commparison with other objects is not possible. Without this comparison, one cannot cognize common features as common, and special features as special. So at the first, indeterminate, stage of perception both the features are cognized in themselves, but they are not recognized as such.[33]

We now discuss the text of Gaṅgeśa. Three definitions of qualificative cognition are examined from the standpoint of Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā. (a) The first definition of qualificative cognition is that in a qualificative cognition what are, as a matter of fact, the qualifier and the qualificand get manifested. For example, in the qualificative cognition of the cow, the cow (the animal) is the qualificand and cowness is the qualifier as a matter of fact. So the qualificative cognition of the cow is about the qualifier and the qualificand.

The difficulty of this definition is that even in indeterminate perception, which is a non-qualificative cognition, what are objectively a qualifier and a qualificand get manifested. Both the cow and cowness are objects of indeterminate perception, although, as has been explained earlier, cowness is not recognized as a universal.

(b) Qualificative cognition is a cognition the object of which is qualifierness. The difficulty of this definition is that qualifieness is the object of the cognition which produces the cognition of difference of the object from other objects. Thus when we know a cow in a qualificative cognition, we ought to know the difference of the cow from everything else. But this difference from everything else is not cognized in qualificative cognition. To cognize cowness, it is not necessary to cognize the difference of cows from non-cows.

(c) Qualificative cognition is cognition the object of which is a relation (qualification). This definition also is not satisfactory because the qualification itself is a qualifier. Thus when we have a qualificative cognition of the cow, we cognize the relation between the cow and cowness. Rucidatta in *Prakāśa* states that in this definition, it is assumed that in a qualificative cognition nothing other than the qualificand and the qualifier gets cognized. So the relation between the qualificand and the qualifier becomes a part of the qualifier itself.[34]

The difficuly in this definition is that even in indeterminate perception the relation as a part of the qualifier is cognized. So there will be infinite regress in the causal explanation; for a qualificative cognition is caused by the cognition of the qualifier which is the object of indeterminate perception. But if in indeterminate perception a relation gets known as a part of the qualifier, then that qualifier has got to be cognized in an earlier cognition and so on ad infinitum.

## 7.2 Other definitions of qualificative cognition examined.

नापि सप्रकारकज्ञानत्वम्, प्रकारश्च विषयताविशेष इति वाच्यम् । ज्ञानविषयस्वरूपातिरिक्ताया विषयताया अभावात् । न च विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वं सप्रकारत्वम् । यद्विशेषणज्ञानजन्यं यत् स एव तत्र प्रकार इति गौरिति विकल्पे तस्यैव साध्यत्वात्, ईश्वरज्ञानस्य निष्प्रकारकत्वापाताच्च । नाप्यतद्व्यावृत्तिविषयत्वं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वम् । अपोहवादनिरासेन गौरिति विकल्पे तथात्वासिद्धेः । नाप्यतद्व्यावृत्तिबोधजनकत्वं तत् । आलोचनव्यावृत्तानुगतरूपमन्तरेण अतद्व्यावृत्तबोधजनकत्वस्य ग्रहीतुमशक्यत्वात् । न च गौरिति ज्ञानमेतदन्यसविकल्पकान्यज्ञानभिन्नं प्रमेयत्वात्, यद्वा चक्षुः चाक्षुषसविकल्पकज्ञानातिरिक्तज्ञानजनकम् इन्द्रियत्वादिति तत्सिद्धिः । अप्रयोजकत्वात्, उभयत्र सविकल्पकपदानन्तरं निर्विकल्पकादिपदप्रक्षेपेण तृतीयादिज्ञानसिद्धिप्रसङ्गाच्चेति ।

**Translation :** (Obj.) It is also not being cognition with modes, a mode of cognition being a particular objectivity.

**Reply :** Objectivity is not an additional (*ontological*) entity other than the cognition and the object. Also it is not a cognition with a mode which is produced by a cognition of the qualifier.

**(Criticism) :** That which is produced by cognition of which qualifier, is the mode in the cognition. Then in the determinate perception of the cow, what is the probandum, and also God's cognition becomes cognitions without a mode. Nor does qualificative cognition have an object distinguished from everything else; *apoha* theory being refuted, in the determinate perception of the cow, that is not proved. Nor is it the cause of cognition of difference from everything else. The cause of the cognition of everything else cannot be conceived except as what is common to what is different from indeterminate perception. Not also is the cognition 'the cow' different from cognitions which are different from determinate perceptions which are different from this perception, because of being an object of true cognition, or, one can argue that the eyes are causes of what is other than determinate visual cognitions, because they are sense-organs. (This inference is invalid) because this is not conclusive, and also in both cases by introducing the word 'indeterminate' after 'determinate', a third type of cognition could be proved.

**Explanation :** In this passage four different definitions of qualificative cognition are explained, examined and rejected. (1) The first definition is that qualificative cognition is that cognition which has a mode. In the qualificative cognition of the cow, cowness is the mode (qualifier).

The criticism of this definition is based on the difficulties involved in the concept of a mode of cognition. (a) The first definition of a mode of cognition is that it is a special object of the cognition. Thus when one knows the cow, one has a complex object containing three elements—the cow (the qualificand), cowness (the mode), and inherence (the qualification). So to be a mode of a qualificative cognition is to be an object of the second type.

Now the criticism of this concept of the mode of a cognition is that being an object of cognition, even a special type of object (of the second type), is not an ontologically separate entity. Objecthood, i.e., being an object of cognition, is not anything more than the cognition and the object. The 'of' in 'cognition of an object' does not stand for any real relation different from the cognition and the object. So if the mode of a cognition is objecthood of a special type, then there is no such objecthood other than the cognition and its object. (b) A second definition of a cognition having a mode is that it is caused by a cognition of the qualifier. A cognition will have a mode if and only if it is caused by a cognition of the qualifier. Thus the determinate cognition of the cow having cowness as its mode is caused by the prior cognition of cowness which is the qualifier.

The difficulty of this definition is that if the mode of a cognition is that which is caused by a cognition of that qualifier, then the probandum of the inference, being caused by a cognition of the qualifier, becomes the same as the probans which is, being a qualificative cognition. For a cognition with a mode is the same as qualificative cognition. Moreover, God's knowledge cannot be determinate, for it, being eternal , is not caused at all, hence not caused by a cognition of the qualifier. (2) A qualificative cognition is next defined as that cognition which has as its object its distinction from what is not a qualificative cognition. Now, in the determinate perception of the cow, which is a qualificative cognition, cowness is that which distinguishes a cow from non-cows. According to the Buddhistic doctrine of *apoha,* a universal like cowness is not what is common to all and only cows, but it is that which distinguishes cows from non-cows. A universal is, therefore, not a positive entity, but is merely negative. As there are no real negative objects, a universal is merely a mental construction.

Now against this definition it is pointed out that the Buddhistic doctrine of *apoha* has been refuted in Nyāya. So in the qualificative cognition of the cow as cowness-possessing, the cognition of the universal is not the mere distinction of cows from non-cows.

Jayadeva Miśra in *Āloka* argues differently. Even though by refuting *apohavāda,* cowness can no longer be regarded as difference from non-cows, it can still be held that cowness is the qualifier, the cow is the qualificand and difference from non-cows is the qualification. That is why a further objection is raised and answered. The objection is that qualificative cognition is that which produces the cognition of difference from everything else. The answer is that the difference cannot be cognized except as what is common to all indeterminate (non-qualificative) cognitions. Hence the concept of indeterminate perception becomes logically prior to that of determinate cognition.[35]

(3) A third definition of qualificative cognition is that it is the *cause* of cognition of distinction from everything else. The difference between (2) and (3) is that while in the former a qualificative cognition is defined as a cognition having distinction from everything else as its object, in the latter this distinction is the *cause* of the qualificative cognition.

The criticism of this definition is that the distinction of qualificative cognition from *everything else* is simply the distinction of qualificative cognition from non-qualificative, i.e, indeterminate. perception. Thus all qualificative cognitions will have the property common to the cognitions of distinction from indeterminate cognition. Thus indeterminate perception is proved.

The point here is that if we cannot define qualificative cognition, then we cannot define indeterminate, non-qualificative, cognition, for it is simply the other of qualificative cognition. (4) A fourth way to explain how a qualificative cognition is different from everything else is to point out that a qualificative cognition need not be distinguished from non-qualificative cognitions; it is sufficient if one particular qualificative cognition having one mode is distinguished from *other qualificative* cognitions having different modes.

This is sought to be proved by two inferences.

(a) The (qualificative) cognition '(the) cow', different from a cognition which is different from another determinate cognition having a mode different from this, as it is an object of true cognition.

I shall follow Rucidatta in explaining this complicated inference.

This inference involves 4 steps :

(i) There is the (determinate) cognition of the cow, in which cowness is the mode (qualifier).

(ii) A determinate cognition which is different from (i) : for example, the determinate cognition of the pot, in which potness is the mode which is different from cowness which is the mode in (i), so a determinate cognition different from (i).

(iii) A cognition different from (ii). Now there are two possibilities here : (a) (iii) may be (i), for (iii) is different from (ii), and (ii) is different from (i); so (iii) may be (i). (b) The other possibility is that (iii) may be an indeterminate cognition, for (ii) is a determinate cognition.

(iv) A cognition different from (iii).

Now (iv) cannot be (i) for (iii) (a) identifies (iii) with (i) and (iv) is different from (iii), so that (i) would be different from itself— which is a self-contradiction. So (iv) has to be different from (iii) (b), i.e., from an indeterminate cognition, hence (iv) must be a determinate cognition. So determinate cognition is proved on the basis of 3 differences — (ii), (iii) and (iv) from a determinate perception[36]

(B) A second inference is that the eyes produce cognition which is other than visual determinate cognition, the reason being the eyes are sense-organs.

But these inferences are invalid for two reasons. (i) The probantia of these inferences are not conclusive, ie., the inferences commit the fallacy of *non sequitur*. For in (A) the probans, being an object of true cognition, is present in everything real. It is really an unnegatable (global) property present in everything real. But the probandum—the complex property having 4 steps explained earlier is not present everywhere. So there will be many objects, such as jars, etc., where the probans will be present, but the probandum will not be present. Hence the probans does not have invariable concomitance with the probandum, and is non-conclusive.

The probans of inference (B) is, being a sense-organ. This property is present in all sense-organs, and not merely the eyes which are the locus of the inference. But as every sense-organ does not *always* give rise to indeterminate perception, the conclusion is not proved.

(ii) But these inferences are not valid also for this reason, for by inserting 'indeterminate cognition' after 'determinate cognition', in both cases, a third kind of cognition would be proved. This means that the two inferences could be reconstructed in the following way :

(A) The first inference reconstructed—The (qualificative) cognition '(the) cow' is different from a cognition which is different from other determinate cognitions and *also* from indeterminate cognition.

This means that (iii) (b) will be excluded. So (iv) cannot be (i), nor can it be different from indeterminate cognition (iii) (b). Hence (iv) will prove a third kind of cognition which is neither determinate nor indeterminate.

(B) The same will be true for the second inference.

### 8.1 Gaṅgeśa's solution

**अत्रोच्यते। प्राथमिकं गौरिति प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानं जन्यविशेषणज्ञानजन्यं जन्यविशिष्टज्ञानत्वात् अनुमितिवत्। न च स्मरणं तत्र संभवति। तज्जन्मनि तेन गोत्वस्याननुभवात्। अथ यथा बालस्याद्यप्रवृत्तिबलात् प्राग्भवीय संस्काराद्व्याप्तिस्मरणं तथेहापि जन्मान्तरीयसंस्कारात् गोत्वस्मरणमस्तु, प्राथमिकविशिष्टज्ञानबलादिति चेत्—**

न । जीवनादृष्टेन तत्र संस्कारोद्बोधात्तथास्तु । इह तु न विलक्षणमुद्बोधकमस्ति ।

अतो गोत्वासंनिकर्षेऽपि गोत्वस्मरणप्रसङ्गः । य एव गोत्वेन्द्रियसंनिकर्षस्तव निर्विकल्पके हेतुः स एव संस्कारोद्बोधक इति चेत्—तर्हि अत्र क्लृप्तकारणभावात् गोत्वेन्द्रियसंनिकर्षात् गोत्वानुभव एव स्यात्, स्मरणसामग्रीतोऽनुभवसामग्र्या बलवत्वात् । न च तद्विशिष्टज्ञानम्, पूर्वविशेषण ज्ञानाभावादित्यर्थान्निर्विकल्पकम् । अत एव न तत्र ज्ञानत्वेन विशिष्टज्ञानत्वानुमानम्, कारणबाधेन बाधात् । यदि चानुभवसामग्रीतः स्मरणं तदा नित्यानां वैदिकार्थानां च स्मरणं स्यात् न त्वनुभवः ।

**Translation :** Here I say this. The first perceptual cognition 'the cow' is caused by cognition of the qualifier, which cognition is itself caused; the reason is that it is qualificative cognition which is caused, the example being inference. Memory cognition is not possible here. In this life, there is no informative cognition of cowness.

It may by argued here that like the child's first purposive action which leads to the postulation of memory cognition of pervasion due to memory traces of past life, so also here cowness may be remembered owing to memory traces of past life. This postulation is justified by the first qualificative cognition.

The reply to this objection is that in the earlier case *adṛṣṭa* would be the excitor of memory traces. But in this case there is no separate excitor.

Moreover, it would lead to the memory of cowness even when there is no contact of the sense-organs with cowness.

It may be argued that the sense-organ-cowness contact

which is, according to you, the cause of indeterminate perception may be regarded as the excitor of memory traces.

The reply to this objection is that in the presence of necessary causal conditions informative cognition of cowness will result from the contact of the sense-organ with cowness. The reason for this is that the causal conditions of informative cognition are stronger than those of memory. That cannot be also qualificative cognition because of absence of the prior cognition of the qualifier. Hence indeterminate perception is established. Therefore, the inference is not of qualificative cognitionness as cognitionness, for there is absence of causal conditions for it. If memory results from causal conditions of informative cognition, then the eternal meanings of the Vedas would always be remembered and there would be no informative cognition of them.

**Explanation :** Here Gaṅgeśa gives his own argument for indeterminate perception. He cites the case of a child perceiving a cow as a cow (as cowness-possessing) for the first time in its life. Now because this perception is a qualificative cognition, it is caused by a prior cognition of the qualifier, cowness. Gaṅgeśa adds that all qualificative cognition is not caused, and hence not caused by a cognition of the qualifier. For example, God perceives all objects, past, present and future, and his perception is determinate perception. But because this perception is eternally there, it is not caused at all. So Gaṅgeśa has to add that all qualificative cognitions which are produced at all are produced by a cognition of the relevant qualifier. Now this cognition of the qualifier, which causes the determinate perception, is itself an effect, i.e., it cannot be an eternal cognition. The problem is to determine the cause of this cognition of the qualifier. As the child is perceiving the cow as a cow for the first time, its cognition of the qualifier, cowness, could not be memory, for it did not have any prior cognition of cowness in this life. So this cognition is indeterminate perception, for if it were not, then it would have required another cognition of the qualifier as its cause, and so on ad infinitum. In that case, the child could not start perceiving a cow as a cow. According to Gaṅgeśa, when the child perceives, for the first time in its life, a cow as cowness-possessing, his eyes first come into relation with cowness, giving rise to a perception of cowness, a universal, in and through itself, without a mode. This perception of cowness, resulting from the relation of the eyes with cowness, is, therefore, indeterminate perception. At the next moment the child perceives the cow as cowness-possessing which is determinate perception. Thus, in order to explain the first determinate perception of the child, an indeterminate perception at the preceding moment has to be postulated.

Against this explanation of Gaṅgeśa, it may be pointed out that Nyāya philosophers postulate memory cognition due to traces of informative cognition acquired in a previous life. For example, the new born baby's action of sucking is a purposive action. According to Nyāya, every purposive action is caused by a cognition that the action leads to a desirable result. How can the new born baby have the cognition of the pervasion that sucking always leads to a desirable result? In order to answer this question, Nyāya philosophers postulate that this cognition of the pervasion is memory due to experience in a previous life. Now if this postulation of experience in a previous life giving rise to memory in this life is justified to explain the first sucking activity of the new born baby, then it can also be postulated that when the child first perceives a cow as a cow, he remembers cowness as experienced in a previous life. So Gaṅgeśa's argument does not prove indeterminate perception.

Gaṅgeśa refutes this objection by pointing out a fundamental difference between the two cases in the behaviour of the child. In the case of sucking, the traces of experience in a previous life which are retained in the self are excited to give rise to memory. The excitation is caused by *adṛṣta*—the child is fated to remember its experience in a previous life. But fate does not function in this way in the case of first perception of cowness. So cowness, even if it were experienced in a previous life, and the self retains the impressions, is not remembered, for there is nothing to excite the impressions. The impressions by themselves do not cause memory; they have to be activated, excited, by some factor or other. If there is nothing to activate the impressions, there will be no memory.

Moreover, Gaṅgeśa points out that if experiences of a past life are always postulated, then there will be memory even if there has not been any perception in this life. That is, if there is no relation of the sense-organs with the object, even then the object might still be remembered. Rucidatta adds here that no one has memory in the absence of the relation of the sense-organ with the object.

Then, it may be argued against Gaṅgeśa that he admits sense-organ-object relation to explain the first perception of cowness. Now what prevents us from arguing that this sense-organ-object relation is what activates the impressions of cowness experienced in a previous life ?

Gaṅgeśa's reply to this argument is based on the concept of strength of causal conditions. The opponent agrues that the same condition— sense-organ-object-relation— may produce either perception or memory by activating impressions received in a previsous life. Now Gaṅgeśa establishes the rule that where conditions for both perception and memory are the same, it is perception that will result, not memory. And this perception cannot be qualificative cognition in the absence of any prior cognition of the qualifier. So indeterminate perception is proved. To support the rule, Gaṅgeśa points out if conditions of memory could prevail over conditions of perception, then no one will be able to 'see' the eternal truths of the Vedas, they will always be remembered by the same cause. But there are 'seers' of Vedic truths, who do not remember them.

8.2 Another objection to infinite regress and Gaṅgeśa's reply

**न च गोत्वज्ञानं गोत्वज्ञानजन्यं जन्यज्ञानजन्यं जन्यविशेषणज्ञाजन्यं चेत्यन्यत्र दर्शनात् प्रथमं न गोत्वानुभव इति वाच्यम् । एकस्यैव जन्यजनकत्वानवच्छेदकत्वात् अनवस्थापाताच्च ।**

**Translation :** It cannot be said: That cognition of cowness is caused by cognition of cowness, is caused by a cognition which is itself caused, and is caused by a cognition of a qualifier, which cognition itself is caused; this is what is seen elsewhere, so there is no first informative cognition of cowness.

For, one and the same property cannot be the limitors of both causeness and effectness; and also because of infinite regress.

**Explanation :** This is an obscure text which I first explain generally[37] and then, according to Rucidata's *Prakāśa.*

The point at issue is that Gaṅgeśa has proposed that the indeterminate perception of cowness is caused by a relation of sense-organs with cowness. But the opponent's theory is that a cognition of cowness can be caused only by a cognition of cowness and that the cognition of cowness which is the cause is itself not an eternal cognition but is itself caused. It is also true that the cognition of cowness is produced by a cognition of the qualifier and that this cognition is also produced. This is true in ordinary experience and hence can be generalized to the case of the so-called first perception of cowness.

Rucidatta, however, states that the cognition of cowness which is caused is the cognition of a relation of cowness (to the cow). But this introduction of the relation of cowness is not done because it involves heaviness and goes against the law of parsimony. Hence we have the causal connection of a cognition of cowness (which could not be asserted to be the cognition of the relation of cowness) with cognition of cowness. It would have been clear if the cognition of cowness which is caused were a qualificative cognition involving the cognition of a relation of cowness to the cow. This is obviously caused by a cognition of cowness which is a cognition of the qualifier. The cognition of the qualifier which causes the qualificative cognition of cowness is itself caused and is not eternal.

Rucidatta also explains the opponent's postion as denying the presence of causal conditions for informative cognition of cowness. Gaṅgeśa has argued that the conditions of perception prevail over the same conditions of memory, but the opponent points out that there are no conditions of perception of cowness here. Hence there is no question of their prevailing over the conditions of memory. Hence as a cognition of cowness is caused by the memory of cowness in ordinary experience Gaṅgeśa has to take a very special case of the child's first perception where a memory of cowness is not possible. But the opponent argues that if memory is involved in all cases except this first perception, then there is no reason to make this exception. Here, too, the cognition of cowness is to be caused by a cognition of cowness (probably memory cognition).[38]

Gaṅgeśa's reply is two-fold. First, he points out that if a cognition of cowness is caused by a cognition of cowness, then the limiting property of the causeness is the same as the limiting property of the effectness. This makes the causal connection wholly unintelligible. The cause and the effect cannot be the same object under the same mode.

Rucidatta, however, points out that if in every causal connection the limiting property of causeness is different from the limiting property of effectness, then this will involve heaviness, postulating two limiting properties different from each other. But Rucidatta says this heaviness is validly inferred and hence is not a defect.[39]

Gaṅgeśa points out another defect in the opponent's position. If every cognition of cowness is to be caused by some other cognition of cowness, then this other cognition of cowness is also to be caused by another cognition of cowness and so on ad infinitum.

It is interesting to note that Rucidatta himself differs from Gaṅgeśa and answers Gaṅgeśa's objections to the opponent's position. Gaṅgeśa has first pointed out that if cognition of cowness is caused by cognition of cowness then the limitors of causeness and effectness become identical. Rucidatta, however, solves this difficulty by holding that the limitor of effectness is produced-cognition-ness. This means that the effect is cognition of cowness which is produced, the limiting property of causeness is, being produced-cognition of the qualifier. This means that the cause is the cognition of the qualifer, which cognition is produced. Thus the limiting properties of effectness and causeness are different. It may be argued against this reply of Rucidatta that the addition of 'qualifier' in the limiting property of causeness goes against the law of parsimony. Rucidatta's reply is that even on Gaṅgeśa's theory the cause must be the cognition of the qualifier. Hence there is no difference in this respect between Gaṅgeśa's theory and the opponent's theory. A further reply of Rucidatta to the objection of the identity of the limiting properties of causeness and effectness is that in the case of a seed being produced by a seed, the limiting property of causenes and effectness is the same, namely, being a seed (seed-ness).

It may be replied on behalf of Gaṅgeśa that when a seed is produced by a seed, there is a difference between the cause which is a preceding seed and the effect which is a succeeding seed. Rucidatta now points out that the same may be said in the case of cognition of cowness. The cognition of cowness which is the cause is a preceding cognition and the cognition of cowness which is the effect is a succeeding cognition. Hence the limiting properties of causeness and effectness are different.

Then, Gaṅgeśa brings forward a second objection to the opponent's position. He argues that this involves infinite regress. If a cognition of cowness is caused by another cognition of cowness, then this cause is again to be caused by a third cognition of cowness and so on ad infinitum. Rucidatta answers here that the infinite regress may be stopped if the causal conditions of a cognition of cowness are not present. When they are accidentally present, then a cognition of cowness results, but not otherwise.

If the infinite regress is stopped anywhere, then if every cognition of cowness is caused by a cognition of cowness, this universal rule will be contravened. For if there is any cognition of cowness which does not have a further cause, then the universal rule is violated.

To avoid this difficulty it may be suggested that the cognitions of cowness which are caused must be qualificative cognitions. The infinite regress is successfully stopped, for, now, only all qualificative cognitions of cowness are caused by cognitions of cowness which need not be qualificative cognitions. So they need not have further causes.

Rucidatta refutes this sort of defence. For, as has already been explained, this infinite regress does not exclude the possibility of death. Indeed, it presupposes death, as the cause of the first memory of cowness in this life would be an experience which one had in a previous life which would be impossible if the individual did not die in his previous life.

It may be objected against this solution that in many cases the infinite regress may be stopped in this way. Yet in the case of cognition of cowness, this accidental presence of conditions cannot obtain. If a produced-cognition is caused by another produced-cognition, then the succession of cognitions can never stop. This will make death impossible.

Rucidatta's reply to this objection is that only if we admit an unending succession of cognitions then death would be impossible. That the first informative cognition (perception) of cowness is caused by memory of experience in the last birth shows the possibility of death.

Then Rucidatta points out that the postulation of indeterminate perception does not solve the difficulty of infinite regress. For according to Gaṅgeśa, this is caused by cognition which itself is produced through the individual's *adṛṣṭa.* Thus even according to Gaṅgeśa, every cognition which is produced is produced by another cognition which is produced. Hence the universal concomitance is admitted by both Gaṅgeśa and his opponent. Rucidatta asks how then can Gaṅgeśa avoid infinite regress. If the first cognition is caused by cognition of a previous life through *adṛṣṭa,* then the first memory cognition is caused by experience in a previous life through its impression in the self. Thus the two theories of Gaṅgeśa and his opponent stand on the same footing so far as infinite regress is concerned.

It is now pointed out that if the informative cognitions of cowness which are caused be regarded as qualificative informative cognitions, there will be heaviness in the limiting property of effectness, which will be being qualificative and informative cognition, instead of the earlier simpler property, being informative cognition.

Moreover, being informative cognition (*anubhavatva*) is a universal and a universal has more right to be regarded as a limitor of effectness or causeness. Hence, cognitions of qualifiers cause only *informative* cognition of cowness. It, therefore, follows that the first memory cognition of cowness, not being an informative cognition, does not need to be caused by any prior cognition of cowness. Hence there is no infinite regress.

The Nyāya theory of causation involves the stock of merit and demerit of an individual due to his past actions especially in previous lives. When any effect is produced, there are many causal factors which co-operate to produce it. Among these causal factors, some are necessary for any effect whatsoever. The factors are called 'general factors'. God's will and knowledge, time, the stock of merit and demerit of individuals, etc., are necessary factors for every effect.Besides these general factors, there are special causal factors operating to produce any effect. For example, if fire is to be produced, fuel will be a necessary special factor over and above God's will etc., which are general causal factors.

Now as human cognitions are always produced—no human cognition is eternally there— the stock of merit and demerit of the individual is necessary as a general causal factor. Now the Nyāya theory is that this stock of merit and demerit is the means by which experiences of previous lives operate to produce a cognition. So Rucidatta points out that even on Gaṅgeśa's theory, experience of previous lives is causally necessary to produce even the first cognition in this life. But, then, even on Gaṅgeśa's theory infinite regress is involved in the causation of cognitions.

So Rucidatta holds that the opponent's position can be justified against Gaṅgeśa's criticism.[40]

### 8.3 Another objection to indeterminate perception and Gaṅgeśa's refutation

ननु गौरित्यत्र गोत्ववैशिष्ट्यं गवि भासते । तथा च तद्विषयकं ज्ञानं स्यात्, तच्च निर्विकल्पकमिति चेत्— गोत्वं हि तत्र विशेषणम्, न तु तद्वैशिष्ट्यम् ।

**Translation (Obj.) :** In the cognition of the cow, the relation to the cow is cognized. So there ought to be cognition of that (relation),and it is indeterminate perception.

**Reply :** The qualifier in the determinate cognition of the cow is cowness, not the relation of cowness (to the cow).

**Explanation:** In the determinate perception of the cow, a complex object consisting of three elements (the qualificand, the qualifier, and the qualification) gets manifested. The opponent's position is that the qualification (relation) of cowness to the cow perceived must also be cognized in the indeterminate perception. But Gaṅgeśa's reply is that it is the cognition of only the qualifier which is causally necessary to produce the determinate perception. As the relation is not a part of the qualifier,[42] it need not be cognized in the indeterminate perception.

### 8.4. Another objection and Gaṅgeśa's reply

**ननु तथाभुतविशेषणधीजन्यविशिष्टज्ञाने विशेषणं स्वधर्मविशिष्टं कथं भासेत, पुर्वं तस्यानवगमात् । अवगमे वा तस्यापि विशेषणान्तरवतो विशेषणमिति अनवस्थेति चेत्—न । गौरिति विशिष्टज्ञाने विशिष्टस्य गोत्वस्याभानात् ।**

**Translation :** (Obj.) In the qualificative cognition caused by the cognition of that kind of qualifier how can the qualifier be manifested as being qualified by its own property which was not previously cognized ? If that is already cognized, then the qualifier will be qualified by a further qualifier— this is an infinite regress.

**Reply :** In the qualificative cognition, 'the cow' the cowness qualified by a further qualifier is not revealed.

**Explanation :** The opponent here argues that in a qualificative cognition, the qualifier itself will be qualified by its own property. Then the problem is whether this further property of the qualifier is revealed or not revealed in a previous cognition. If it is not revealed in a previous cognition, then it cannot be cognized as qualifiying the qualifier. If it is previously cognized, then the qualifier being qualified by its own properties will have to be cognized; this would require a previous cognition of the qualifier of the qualifier and so on ad infinitum.[43]

Gaṅgeśa replies to this objection by pointing out that in qualificative cognition 'the cow' cowness is the qualifier. But as cowness is a universal, it is cognized in and through itself, not through any property. Hence there is no infinite regress, nor any question of cognizing the qualifier of the qualifier.

### 8.5. A further objection and its reply

**अथ सर्वं विशेषणं विशेषणवदेव । गोत्वादावपि**

**व्यक्त्यादेर्विशेषणत्वादिति चेत्—अस्तु तथा । किं तु विशेषणं विशेषणवदेव भासेतेति न नियमः । अन्यथा गौरिति ज्ञाने विशेषणतद्विशेषणानन्तपरंपराविषयत्वे विषयापर्यवसानप्रसङ्गः । क्वचिन्निर्विशेषणस्यापि भाने प्रथमतोऽपि तथा स्यादविशेषात् । न च विशिष्टज्ञानत्वादित्यत्र हेतोर्व्यर्थविशेषणत्वम् । येन विशेषणेन विना व्याप्तिर्ग्रहीतुं न शक्यते तस्यैव सार्थकत्वात् । व्यभिचारवारकस्यापि सार्थकत्वे एतदेव मूलम् । इहापि ज्ञानत्वविशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वयोः विशेषणं विना व्याप्तिः ग्रहीतुं न शक्यते, अनवस्थानात् सामान्यतो व्यभिचारावगमात् ।**

**Translation :** (Obj.) Now every qualifier is further qualified. Even in the case of cowness it is qualified by the individuals etc.

**Reply :** Let it be. But there is no rule that every qualifier is cognized as being further qualified. Otherwise, in the cognition 'the cow' if the object of a cognition is an unending series of a qualifier, its qualifier and so on, then there will be no object of cognition. In some case of a cognition of a qualifierless object, there is from the very first its indeterminate perception as there is no qualifier.

**Objection:** In the inference (for indeterminate perception) the probans is, qualified cognition. Here the qualifier 'qualified' is useless.

**Reply :** That qualifier without which invariable concomitance cannot be cognized is significant. This is the reason for a qualifier which prevents deviation being signifiicant. Here, too, both cognitionness and being a cognition caused by a cognition of a qualifier, cannot be cognized as invariably related without these qualifiers, for it would lead to infinite regress and deviation, without the qualifiers.

**Explanation :** Gaṅgeśa here rejects another theory of determinate perception. The opponents argue that every qualifier is qualified as a matter of fact. Even cowness has as its qualifier the individual cows. Cowness is related to (all and only) individual cows; hence cowness is qualified by invididual cows. We can always say that cowness resides in, and is hence qualified, by individual cows. Now Gaṅgeśa admits that this may be a correct description of a matter of fact. Still there is no rule that every qualifier has to *be cognized* only as being qualified. If a qualifier of a qualifier had to be cognized, then there could not have been any cognition of the cow without cognizing the infinite series of qualifiers— an impossibility. If there is cognition of no qualifier, there would be indeterminate cognition at the very first stage. As has been stated above, cowness can be cognized in and through itself without any qualifier. So cowness is cognized in indeterminate perception at the first stage.

Now in the inference for indeterminate perception, the probans is, being qualificative cognition. Here it may be questioned whether the adjective 'qualificative' (or the qualifier, qualificative) is significant or not. Here Gaṅgeśa gives a criterion of significance of a qualifier. That qualifier alone is significant which is necessary for cognizing invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum. A qualifier which prevents deviation is significant for this very reason. For if the probans deviates from the probandum (if the probans is present in a locus where the probandum is absent), then there is no invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum. In the present inference for indeterminate perception, the probandum has to be, being a cognition and being produced by a cognition of the qualifier, otherwise there would be no cognition of invariable concomitance (pervasion). If the probandum were mere (unqualified) cognition, then there would be infinite regress; a cognition would be caused by another cognition and so on ad infinitum. That is, without the qualifiers of the probans (being a qualificative cognition) and of the probandum (being caused by a cognition of the qualifier), there would be no cognition of pervasion between them. Hence the qualifiers of the probans and the probandum are significant.

### 8.51. Further explanation of significance of qualifiers

**अत एव चक्षुस्तैजसत्वादिसाधने रूपादिपु मध्ये रूपस्यैव व्यञ्जकत्वादित्यादौ असिद्धिवारकमपि विशेषणं सार्थकम्। तेन विना रूपस्यैव व्यञ्जकत्वादित्यस्याप्रसिद्धे र्व्याप्त्यग्रहात्। विशेषणं विनापि यत्र व्याप्तिग्रहस्तत्र व्यर्थविशेषणत्वम्, यथा नीलधूमत्वशरीराजन्यत्वादौ ।**

**Translation :** Therefore, in the inference of eyes being constituted by the element of fire, when it is said that among colours etc., only colour is manifested (by eyes), the qualifier preventing the fallacy of *asiddhi* is significant. Without this (qualifier) the manifestor-ness of only colour would be impossible, and hence the pervasion would not be cognized. Where pervasion is cognized even without the qualifier, it is useless (non-signiicant), as in the cases of bule-smoke-ness and being not produced by a body.

**Explanation :** Here Gaṅgeśa further explains the concept of a significant qualifier. He has already stated that that qualifier is significant which is necessary for cognizing pervasion, and that which prevents deviation. Now he adds that a qualifier is significant if it prevents the fallacy of *asiddhi*. The example that he gives is of the cognition of pervasion in the inference proving the eyes to be constituted by the element of fire. According to Nyāya, the sense-organs are not parts of the body, but are imperceptible elements. Nyāya admits five elements of earth, water, fire air and *ākāśa*. The five sense-organs are constituted by these five elements. The inference which proves eyes to be constituted by fire has a probans which has qualifiers. The inference is as follows :

Eyes are made of fire, the reason being—the manifestor of colour of other objects, not being a manifestor of touch etc., of other objects, like a lamp.

This means that the eyes manifest only colour belonging to other objects, but not smell, taste, touch and sound of other objects. There are two qualifiers, or a very complex qualifier, of the probans—being a manifestor of a colour belonging to other objects, and not being a manifestor of other qualities belonging to other objects. The first qualifier 'belonging to other objects' is significant because without it the probans will apply to such objects as jars. For jars do not manifest touch etc. of other objects, but manifest their own colour. So the pervasion will be too wide applying to jars which are not eyes. But if the qualifier 'belonging to other objects' is added, then this over-extension is prevented, for jars although they manifest their own colours, cannot manifest colours of other objects which only a lamp having a flame (fire) can do, as also do eyes. so eyes, like lamps. are made of fire.
Another qualifier, not mentioned so far, has to be added to the probans.

This is—being a substance (substance-hood). For even the contact of the eyes with objects manifests colours of these other objects and do not manifest touch etc., of other objects. So the probans has to be qualified by substancehood, for eye-object contact is not a substance. So the probans when fully cognized will have three qualifiers—(i)substance-hood, (ii) being the manifestor of colours of other objects, and a negative qualifer, (iii) not being a manifestor of touch etc., of other objects. Only when all these qualifiers are cognized in the probans, the pervasion between the probans and the probandum (being made of the clement of fire) can be cognized. So all these qualifiers are significant.

Where pervasion is cognized without qualifiers, the qualifiers are otiose. For example, in cognizing the pervasion between smoke and fire, if the additional qualifier of the probans, blue smoke, is given, it has no significance and is useless. So also in the inference of God's existence,. the pervasion is between the dyads and being produced. Now if one adds that dyads cannot be produced by God, for he does not have a body , and no one without a body can be an agent, the qualifier 'without having a body' is useless. For the pervasion is between an effect and a cause, not between an effect and a cause having a body. So being blue smoke, and not being caused by a body are useless qualifiers in the above context.

### 9. Concept of qualified object explained

यस्य यत्र यः संबन्धः स एव तत्र तस्य वैशिष्ट्यम् । तेन हि स्वासंबद्धेभ्यो व्यावृत्तो बोध्यते । यथा दण्डी पुरुष इति ज्ञाने दण्डसंबन्धः पुरुषेऽवगत इति तेनायमदण्डव्यावृत्तो बोध्यते तथा गौरिति विकल्पेऽपि । तथा च विशेषणवद्विशेष्यज्ञानत्वं विशिष्टज्ञानत्वम् । एतदेवातद्व्यावृत्तबोधजनकतावच्छेदकम् ।

**Translation :** The relation of something in something is the qualification of that in that. Hence all those which are not so related to it are cognized as different from it. As in the cognition, 'stick-possessing (is the) man' the relation of the stick with the man being cognized, those which are not so related with the stick are cognized as being different from the stick-possessor, so also in the determinate cognition '(the) cow'. Therefore, being a qualificative cognition is being a cognition of a qualificand possessing a qualifier. This is the limitor of the causeness of the cognition of difference from everything else.

**Explanation :** Both Rucidatta and Jayadava Miśra point out that if a qualificative cognition is defined as being a cognition of a qualified object then this is impossible. For Nyāya philosophers admit no independent reality of any qualified object. For example, the stick-possessor is not anything other than someone related to a stick. The person is real, the stick is real, so is the relation between them, but there is no real complex object other than these three. When an apparently complex object is cognized, the object of cognition has to be analysed into simple objects. The world, according to Nyāya, is the totality of objects; there are no facts in the sense of *Tractatus;* there are no complex objects, i.e., objects qualified by other objects as independent reals.

So both the commentators say that Gańgeśa has to explain the cognition of a complex object, for in determinate perception an object qualified by another (a cow qualified by cowness) is cognized. Gańgeśa's solution is to analyse a complex object into two simple objects and a relation between them. Being related to something is to be qualified by that something.

To cognize a qualified object is to cognize it as different from other objects which are not so qualified. Now Gańgeśa says that a cognition of a relation has exactly the same consequence. He gives the example of the cognition of a stick-possessor. A person holding a stick in his hand is not ontologically a new entity. What are real are the person, the stick, and the relation between them. When we cognize this relation of the stick to the man, the man is differentiated from everyone not so related to that particular stick.

### 9.1. Objection to Gańgeśa's theory and reply

ननु दण्डपुरुषसंबन्धा इत्यत्रापि दण्डसंबन्धः पुरुषेऽवगत इति ततोऽप्यदण्डव्यावृत्तपुरुषबोधः स्यादिति चेत्—भवत्येव, दण्डसंबन्ध एव पुरुषे दण्डज्ञानं विना न ज्ञायत इति ब्रूमः । यत्र विशिष्टज्ञानसामग्री नास्ति तत्र निर्विकल्पकम्, ज्ञानकरणजन्ये सर्वत्र विशेषणज्ञानजन्यत्वान्न तदिति प्रत्यक्षमेवैतदिति ।

**Translation :** (Obj.) Even in the case of (conjunctive) cognition of (three objects) the stick, the man, and the relation, the relation of the stick with the man being cognized, there ought to result a cognition of the man as different from everything not possessing the stick.

**Reply :** This may be granted. We shall say that even the relation of the stick with the man cannot be cognized unless the stick is cognized. When the causal conditions for a qualificative cognition are not present, there indeterminate cognition results. In every case of cognition which has another cognition as its instrumental cause, what is being produced by a cognition of a qualifier is not perception at all.

**Explanation :** Rucidatta here points out that the opponent assumes that in the conjunctive cognition of the stick, the man, and the relation, the relation between the stick and the man is the object of the cognition and is, therefore, cognized. As a matter of fact, this is not the rule in conjunctive cognition. For the sake of argument, Gańgeśa accepts the position of the opponent, but points out that without a prior cognition of the stick, there cannot be any cognition of the relation of the stick to the man. This is because in the conjunctive cognition, the man and the stick are independently cognized, the stick is not the qualifier, and the man is not the qualificand, of the cognition. A conjunctive cognition is defined as the cognition which has more than one (principal) qualificand. In this case the man is a qualificand, and being that man is its qualifier; the stick is another qualificand, and stick-ness is its qualifier. But the stick is not a qualifier of the man. This is what happens in the qualificative cognition, the man is qualified by the stick, i.e., related to the stick.

Then Rucidatta mentions that when Gańgeśa says that a cognition which has another cognition as its instrumental cause is not a perception at all, some interpret this to mean only that it is not indeterminate perception. That is, by the word 'perception' Gańgeśa means 'inderminate perception' here.

Indeterminate perception occurs only when there is absence of (the totality of) causal conditions for qualificative cognition.

Now Rucidatta mentions this interpretation without accepting it. The reason for his not accepting it seems to be that Gaṅgeśa has defined perception (and not merely 'indeterminate perception') as that cognition which does not have a cognition as its instrumental cause. We have already mentioned this definition of perception by Gaṅgeśa.[43]

### 10. Cognition of negation explained

अत एवाभावे न निर्विकल्पकम् । तद्बुद्धौ प्रतियोग्यधिकरणज्ञानयोः कारणत्वेन तदुभयविशिष्टज्ञान सामग्रीनियमात् । यद्यभावे न निर्विकल्पकं, तदा घटाभाववद्भूतलमिति ज्ञानं न स्यात्, विशेषणज्ञानं विना तदभावात् । भावे वा न निर्विकल्पकसिद्धिः । विशिष्टज्ञानत्वस्य तत्रैव व्यभिचारादिति चेत्—न । प्रथमं भूतले घटं नास्तीतिबुद्धिः । तत्र भूतलं विशेषणम्, अभावो विशेष्यः । विशेष्यज्ञानं च न कारणम् । पश्चाद्भूतलविशेष्यकं घटाभाववदिति ज्ञानम् ।

**Translation :** (Obj.) Hence there is no indeterminate cognition of negation. For, that cognition which requires as causes cognitions of both the counterpositive and the locus, is causally determined by causal factors of the cognition qualified by both. If there is no indeterminate cognition of negation, then there would be no cognition 'negation-of-the-jar-possessing floor', that being impossible without a cognition of the qualifier. If such a cognition is actual, then indeterminate cognition is not proved. The probans—being qualificative cognition—is deviant just here.

**Reply :** At the first stage the cognition is—(there is ) no jar on the floor. In that cognition the floor is the qualifier and the negation the qualificand. Cognition of the qualificand is not a cause. Afterwards the cognition with the floor as the qualificand, i.e., of negation-of-the-jar-possessing floor, occurs.

**Explanation :** Here Gaṅgeśa explains how negation can be perceived. A negation has to be located somewhere. For example, if there is no jar on the floor, this can be cognized in two different ways. The difference in the cognitions is due to the change in the qualifier and qualificand of the cognitions. If the cognition is, the floor is negation-of-the-jar-possessing, then the floor is the qualificand and negation of the jar is the qualifier of the cognition. If, however, the cognition is, there is negation-of-the-jar on the floor, it is the negation-of-the-jar which is the qualificand and the floor is the qualifier. The first cognition answers the question, which floor is cognized ? The answer is that the floor which is qualified by the negation-of-the-jar is cognized. In the second cognition, the question is, which negation is being perceived? The reply is that the negation-of-the-jar that is on the floor that is, the negation qualified by the floor, is cognized. Thus in the first cognition it is the negation-of-the-jar which is the qualificand.

This is a very rough statement of the Nyāya position, for when we perceive an object, we do not first begin with a question. So a perceptual cognition cannot answer any previous question. This is because of the Nyāya theory that all qualificative cognitions have to be analysed into a qualificand, a qualifier, and a relation between them. The qualificand is the first term, the qualifier the second term, of the relation cognized. If in another cognition the converse of the earlier relation gets cognized, then the qualificand and the qualifier of the earlier cognition get transposed. This difference between the qualifier and the qualificand is not the same as the difference between predicate and subject of a cognition. All qualificative cognitions do not have subject and predicate, although they all have a qualificand and a qualifier. This is because the subject of a cognition is defined as that about which we cognize and the predicate is that which is cognized about the subject. Now the Nyāya theory is that when we perceive an object we do not have any idea of what we are perceiving about or of what we are perceiving about it. That is, perceptual cognition, even when it is qualificative, does not contain any distinction between subject and predicate. But in inference, we always know what we are inferring about what. Hence in every inference, there is a distinction between a subject and a predicate in the conclusion. Yet is may so happen that the qualicand becomes the subject and the qualifier the predicate, or the other way round. It all depends upon the form of the cognition of the conclusion of the inference. For example, we may conclude that the hill is fire-possessing or that fire is on the hill. In both the forms, the subject and the predicate remain the same, for we are inferring fire on the hill. Hence fire is the predicate in both the cases. As a matter of fact, the probandum of an inference is the predicate in the conclusion and the locus of the inference is the subject of the conclusion. Yet the qualificand and the qualifier in the conclusion get transposed, for in the two forms of the conclusion, two different relations—a relation and its converse—get cognized in the two cases. So the distinction between the qualificand and the qualifier is determined by the relation cognized; while the subject and the predicate are determined by what we want to infer about what. So also when we know anything second-hand from what others tell us, our cognition has both the distinction of qualificand and qualifier and that between a subject and a predicate.

It should be noted that there is a fundamental difference between the Western concepts of subject and predicate and the Nyāya concepts. It is universally accepted in Western philosophy and logic that the distinction between subject and predicate can be made only in a judgement, a proposition or a sentence. There is a fundamental difference between a sentence and a name, even a complex name. It is only rarely that this difference between a sentence and a name is not made in Western philosophy, as, for example, in Frege. He holds that a proposition is the sense of a sentence which is a name of a truth value. But this type of theory obliterating the difference between a sentence and a name is uncommon in Western philosophy. In Indian philosophy, on the other hand, there is no difference in the cognition expressed in language either by a complex term or a sentence. 'The brown table' and 'the table is brown' are expressions of the same cognition. There is no difference between the attributive and the predicative use of adjectives in Navya-Nyāya.

After this long digression we come back to our explanation of Gaṅgeśa's text. According to the opponent, there can be no cognition of negation in indeterminate perception. For whenever we cognize a negation, we have to cognize it only as located in something. For example, we cognize that there is no jar on the floor. Even if we have a so-called negative existential like 'tame lions do not exist', we have to know the negation (absence) of tame lions in the world. Thus, in every cognition of negation, we have to cognize both the counterpositive and the locus of the negation. So both the cognitions are causes of the cognition of a negation. But to have this causal relation, there must be sufficient conditions for the cognition of what is qualified by both. Because this is a qualificative cognition, there can be no indeterminate cognition of negation.

The next step in the argument of the opponent is that, if there be no indeterminate cognition of negation, then we cannot have a cognition of the form, negation-of-the-jar-possessing floor. For in this cognition, negation-of-the-jar is the qualifier, and if we cannot cognize this qualifier, we cannot have the determinate cognition of the floor qualified by the negation-of-the-jar. If we do have this cognition of negation without the cognition of the qualifier, then there is no reason for indeterminate perception. For the probans, being a qualificative cognition, in the inference deviates in this case. Thus the opponent presents a dilemma. Either the cognition of negation qualifying a locus is impossible or it is possible. If it is impossible then a determinate cognition of negation cannot be explained; if it is possible without a cognition of the qualifier, then the argument for indeterminate perception is invalid.

Gaṅgeśa replies to this objection by asserting that at the first stage the cognition of negation has the locus as its qualifier, and not the negation. That is, according to Gaṅgeśa, the first cognition of negation-of-the-jar has the form 'the negation-of-the-jar is on the floor', where it is the floor which becomes the qualifier. We can, of course, have indeterminate perception of the universal, being the floor(*bhutalatva*). The negation-of-the-jar is the qualificand of this cognition and cognition of the qualificand is not a cause of determinate perception. When we have this cognition of the floor qualifying the negation-of-the-jar, then later, we have the cognition of the floor as the qualificand and the negation-of-the-jar as the qualifier.

Rucidatta, here, tries to support the opponent. He first states an objection of the opponent to Gaṅgeśa's theory that the cognition of the qualificand is not the cause of qualificative cognition. The opponent points out that in the cognition of the conclusion of an inference, even the cognition of the locus of the inference is a cause. For example, in the inference, 'fire-possessing is the hill', fire, the probandum, is the qualifier, and the locus, the hill, is the qualificand. Similarly, the cognition of the qualificand is cause of the cognition of the negation. On the strength of this argument, there would be indeterminate perception of negation. For there is no reason to choose between the cognition of the qualifier and the cognition of the qualificand as the cause of qualificative cognition.

It may be argued that it will be simpler to hold that for any perception of negation, the cognition of the substratum is a cause; hence if the totality of causal conditions of qualificative cognition are present, then there would be perception of negation.

Rucidatta, then, replies to this objection to the opponent's position. In the absence of any cognition of the qualificand there cannot be the totality of causal conditions of qualificative cognition. So there can be indeterminate perception of negation. So also let indeterminate perception be caused by the epistemic relation of a cognized universal to its instances. If it is argued that the mere presence of the universal as sense-object contact is the cause of indeterminate perception, not its cognition, then the same may be said about the cognition of the qualifier.

### 10.1 Objection to Gaṅgeśa's theory and his reply

ननु इन्द्रियसंबद्धविशेषणतया अभावो गृह्यत इत्युक्तम् । अतः कथं स विशेष्य इति चेत्—भूतलविशेषणतया स्वभावप्रत्यासत्या गृह्यत इति तदर्थः । न त्वभावस्य विशेषणतया भानमिति । अत एव वायौ रूपाभाव इति प्रतीतेश्चाक्षुषत्वमुक्तमाचार्यैः । अयोग्यविशेष्ये इन्द्रियस्यासामर्थ्यात् । ज्ञानत्वे च निर्विकल्पकं विषयविशिष्टत्वांशे सविकल्पकमपि । अनुव्यवसायस्य व्यवसायजन्यत्वेन नियमतः पूर्वं विषयरूपविशेषणभानात्तत्रैव ज्ञाने तदेव ज्ञानं निष्प्रकारकं सप्रकारकं चेति न विरुद्धम्, अंशभेदमादायाविरोधात् ।

**Translation :** (Obj.) It has been said that negation is cognized (perceived) by the epistemic relation of the sense-organ to the object by sense-organ-contact-cum-qualifierness. Then how is that the qualificandum?

**Reply :** This means that negation is perceived by qualifierness of the floor, which is the epistemic relation by its very nature. It is not the case that negation is cognized as a qualifier. Hence the Ācārya has said that the perception of negation of colour in air is visual perception. Sense-organs do not have the ability to reveal a qualificand which is not fit for perception. There is indeterminate perception of cognitionness and also determinate perception of the part qualified by the object. As introspection is as a rule caused by objective cognition, there is prior cognition of the object as the qualifier. Hence that very cognition is both indeterminate and determinte. There is no inconsistency here as it can be resolved by taking different parts into consideration.

**Explanation :** The opponent raises another objection to the perception of negation. Gaṅgeśa holds that at the first stage of perception of negation, it is the floor which is the qualifier and the negation the qualificand. Now the opponent points out that the relation by which the eyes get related to the negation located in the floor is a complex relation involving a relative product of two relations. The eyes are in contact with the floor to which the negation is related as a qualifier. So the eye is related to the negation by contact-cum-qualifierness. As the negation is related to the floor by qualifierness, the negation cannot be cognized as a qualificand.

Gaṅgeśa's reply to this objection is that the negation is as a matter of fact related to the floor by qualifierness. But this does not mean that the negation is to be cognized as a qualifier. Gaṅgeśa then supports his position by citing an example given by Udayānācārya. Udayana has said that the perception of negation of colour in air is visual perception. Yet, air is not a proper object for visual perception. Hence it is the negation of colour which is visually pereceived. But in this visual perception air is the qualifier and negation of colour is the qualificand. If the qualificand were incapable of being perceived, then the sense-organ of vision could not have produced visual perception. This shows that the qualificand can be perceived by the eyes. So air is not the qualificand, the negation of colour is the qualificand here which is visually perceived.

Gaṅgeśa then raises a different question. Introspective cognition, as has been explained earlier, is in one part indeterminate and in another part determinate. In introspection, an objective cognition is internally perceived. The objective cognition has as its object, say, a jar. In introspection, this cognition of a jar is cognized. The object is the qualifier of the objective cognition, for the cognition is related to, qualified by, the object. In the introspective cognition it is the objective cognition itself that becomes the object. Hence, the objective cognition itself becomes the qualifier of the introspective cognition. As the introspective cognition is caused by the objective cognition, it invariably precedes the introspective cognition. Hence the introspective cognition, in so far as it cognizes the objective cognition, i.e., has the cognition of the qualifier as its cause, is determinate perception. But the introspective cognition, so far as it is a cognition of cognitionness (a universal) resident in the cognition is indeterminate. One cannot perceive internally a cognition of a jar, without first perceiving cognitionness. There is no inconsistency in holding that one and the same introspective cognition is both indeterminate and determinate. For it is indeterminate only as cognition of cognitionness, and is determinate only as cognition of cognition of the jar. So also we may hold without inconsistency that one and the same table is in one part red and in other parts green.

### 10.2. Further explanation

**अत एव निर्विकल्पकत्वसविकल्पकत्वे न जाती, चाक्षुषत्वादिना संकरापत्तेः । गौरिति सविकल्पकमपि गोत्वांशे निर्विकल्पकमेव, तत्र प्रकाराभानात्, भाने वा अनवस्था निर्विकल्पकासिद्धिश्च ।**

**इति श्रीमद्गङ्गेशोपाध्यायविरचिते तत्वचिन्तामणौ प्रत्यक्षखण्डे निर्विकल्पकवादः ।**

**Translation :** Therefore indeterminateness and determinateness are not universals, as they overlap with visual perception. Even the determinate perception 'the cow' is indeterminate in the perception of cowness, as there is no cognition of any mode. If a mode be cognized, then there would be infinite regress, and indeterminate perception would be unproved.

**Explanation :** Here Gaṅgeśa gives a final reply to the charge of inconsistency. He holds that indeterminateness and determinateness are not universals, and so they can be ascribed to the same cognition in different parts. The point here is that according to Nyāya there are two types of properties —of pervasive and nonpervasive occurrence. A universal is a property of pervasive occurrence. For example, if an individual is a man, humanity inheres in him. We cannot say that the individual is a man in this part of his body and is not a man in other parts. Humanity pervades every part, every limb, of the man. Even the hair and the nails are human hair and human nails. This is the case with all universals. They occur pervasively in all their instances. But this is not the case with properties other than universals. For example, the colour that belongs to, inheres in, an object, say, a table, does not occur pervasively in it. So it makes sense to say that the table is red in some part and green in some other part. Thus colour is a property of non-pervasive occurrence. If indeterminateness or determinateness were a universal, it would have occurred pervasively in a cognition. In that case we could not say that the cognition is indeterminate in one part and determinate in another part. We can say this if and only if determinateness and indeterminatensess are not universals. This is exactly what Gaṅgeśa says.

There are six impediments to a property being regarded as a universal. One of them is to find out a case where there will be partial overlap of the properties. Universals, according to Nyāya, can never overlap; they can be aranged only as wider and narrower, so that the class of all instances of the narrower universal is properly included in the class of instances of the wider universal. In the case of determinateness and indeterminateness there is the propetrty of being visual perception in which determinateness and indeterminateness are both present. But neither determinateness nor indeterminatenness is a wider universal. So because they overlap without one being properly included in the other, they cannot be regarded as universals.

The following diagrams make the point clear:

Fig. 1

This shows that indeterminate perception and visual perception partially overlap.

Fig. 2.

This shows that determinate perception and visual perception partially overlap.

The two Figures can be combined in one figure as in

Fig. 3.

Gaṅgeśa now concludes this section by stating that even the perception 'the cow', is both determinate and indeterminate. In the perception of the cow, the cow is the qualificand and cowness the qualifier. The cow is cognized as being qualified by cowness, but cowness itself is cognized under no mode. Hence Gaṅgeśa says that so far as the cognition of cowness is concerned, it is indeterminate, and the cognition of the cow under the mode of cowness is determinate. Gaṅgeśa argues that if his theory is not accepted, then cowness would be cognized under a mode and so on ad infinitum. This infinite regress of modes of modes of modes of cognition would rob the theory of indeterminate perception of all cogency.


A
B
Visual Perception
x
x
x
Indeterminate Perception

Fig.1


A
C
Visual Perception
x
x
x
Determinate Perception

Fig.2


A
B
Visual Perception
x
x
x
Indeterminate Perception
x
x
x
Determinate Perception
x
C

Fig.3

## Notes and References

1 "Jñānâ' karaṇakam jñānam iti tu vayam" (p. 595).

2 Ingalls is wrong when he says, "To take another example, the ax is the instrumental cause of felling the tree, but the action of the ax in coming together with the tree is the operation". Then he adds in the footnote to it, "coming together here is an action (*kriyā*), and so must be distinguished from the quality (*guṇa*), conjuction, that resides in two bodies which *have come together*." (*Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, p. 30). This is wrong because the operation is here not an action just as in the case of inference, consideration *(parāmarśa)* is the operation of cognition of pervasion (*vyāpti-jñāna*) which cannot have any action. When contact is the operation, it is not 'coming together'; as in the visual perception of a jar, the operation is the contact of the sense-organ with the jar, and not coming into contact. This operation is the *sannikarṣa* which is contact (a quality). The definition of operation is not applicable to 'coming together' with the object (see below).

3 ननु नृसिंहाकारज्ञानमसिद्धम्, निर्विकल्पकस्यैवासिद्धेरित्यत आह—तच्चेति । (*Prakāśa*, p. 857).

4 ननु नरसिंहाकारज्ञानमित्यसिद्धं सविकल्पस्य प्रत्यक्षधी-जन्यत्वाद्विलक्षणविषयस्य निर्व्विकल्पस्यैव प्रत्यक्षत्वादित्यत आह, 'तच्चेति, (*Āloka*, p. 809).

5 नन्वेवमपि तदनुपपन्नम्, निर्विकल्पकत्वसविकल्पकत्वयोर्विरुद्धजात्योरेकत्रासमावेशदित्यत आह—तत्रेति । (*Prakāśa*, p. 857).

ननु तथापि तथाविधज्ञानानुपपत्तिः निर्व्विकल्पकत्व सविकल्प-कत्वयोर्विरुद्धजात्योरेकत्रासमवायादत आह, 'तत्रेति । (*Āloka*, p. 809-810).

6 विषयगर्भावुभावुपाधी निर्व्विकल्पकत्व—सविकल्पकत्वे न तु जाती इत्यर्थः, (*Āloka*, p. 810) Gaṅgeśa, however, gives a different reason later (see below).

7 नामयोजनारहितम्—इत्यस्य वैशिष्ट्यानवगाहीत्यर्थः । (*Prakāśa*, p. 857).

8 न च प्रतीतिकलह इत्याह, अतीन्द्रियेति । (*Āloka*, p. 810).

9 'साकाङ्क्षेति, यदि वैशिष्ट्यगोचरं विशिष्टज्ञानं भवेत् तदा वैशिष्ट्यज्ञानीयसम्बन्धिनो विशेषणस्य पूर्व्वं ज्ञानमङ्गीक्रियेतेति भावः । (Ibid, p. 810).

10 साकाङ्क्षेति । अगृहीतासंसर्गेत्यर्थः । (*Prakāśa*, p. 857).

11 अवच्छेद्यावछेदकभावापन्न इत्यर्थ इत्यन्ये । (Ibid, p. 857).

12 यद्यपीति । यद्यपि साध्यादिज्ञानत्वेनापि नैव कारणता, व्याप्तिज्ञानादिसत्वे तद्विलम्बेन कार्याविलम्बात्, व्याप्तिज्ञानादिरूपस्यास्य व्याप्तिज्ञानात्वादिनैव हेतुत्वात् । (Ibid, p. 858).

13 'साध्यप्रसिद्धीति, ननु साध्यप्रसिद्ध्यादिर्न हेतुरावश्यकव्याप्तिज्ञानसत्वे तद्विलम्बेन विलम्बाभावात् व्याप्तिधीरेव न तां विनेत्यतो हेतुहेतुत्वमायाति न तु हेतुत्वमिति चेत् । (*Āloka*, p. 811).

14 मैवं । व्याप्तिज्ञानादीनामेव साध्यप्रसिद्ध्यादित्वात् न तु तदन्या साध्यादिप्रसिद्धिर्हेतुः येनान्यथासिद्धिर्भवेत् । (Ibid, pp. 811-812).

15 जन्यविशिष्टज्ञानलक्षणकार्यस्याकस्मिकतापत्त्या अनुगतहेतुगवेषणायामुक्तपर्यवसानात् । (*Prakāśa*, p. 859)

16 तथा च प्रथमतो घटघटत्वयोर्वैशिष्ट्यानवगाह्येव ज्ञानं जायते, तदेव निर्विकल्पकम् । (pp. 186-187)

17 ननु सम्बन्धस्योभयसम्बन्धि निरूप्यत्वाद्विशेष्यधीरपि विशिष्टधीकारणं भवेदिति चेत् । न ।

सम्बन्धो हि प्रतियोगिनिरूप्यो न त्वनुयोगिनिरूप्योऽपि तथैवान्वयाद्यनुविधानात्, रूपवानित्यत्र रूपप्रतियोगिकः समवायो भासते न द्रव्यप्रतियोगिकः तथा सति कदातिद्द्रव्यवद्रूपमित्यपि प्रतीतिः स्यात् । न चैवं संयोगोऽप्यन्यतरसंयोगिमात्रनिरूप्यः स्यादिति वाच्यम् । परोक्षे ज्ञाने पक्षज्ञानादिसापेक्षतयैवापरसंयोगिज्ञाननियमात् प्रत्यक्षे स्वाश्रयघटिसन्निकर्षापेक्षणात् उभयसंयोगिग्रहापेक्षा, व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वेन प्रत्येकपरिसमाप्ताश्रयत्वाभावेन मिलित

एवाश्रयत्वपर्य्याप्तेः व्यासज्यवृत्तौ विशेषे उभयाश्रयज्ञानानुविधानाच्च । (*Āloka*, pp.813- 815)

18 तथा च वैशिष्ट्यस्य संबन्धरूपतया तज्ज्ञानस्य संबन्धिभूतविशेपणधीर्जनिका । संबन्धश्च प्रतियोगिनिरूप्यो न त्वनुयोगिनिरूप्योऽपि । रूपवानित्यत्र च रूपसमवायो भासते न तु द्रव्यप्रतियागिकः । अन्यथा द्रव्यवद्रूपम् इत्यपि धीः स्यात् । संयोगे च व्यासज्यवृत्तितयोभयापेक्षेति वदन्ति । (*Prakāśa*,p. 859)

19 विशेषणे यद्विशेषणं तद्विशेषणतावच्छेदकमित्युच्यते, *Siddhāntamuktāvali on Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ*, verse 58, (p-187)

20 ‘यद्विशेषयोरिति, इदमपि समाधिसौकर्य्यादुक्तं वस्तुतो वैशिष्ट्यस्य प्रतियोगिनिरूप्यत्वादेव विशिष्टबुद्धौ विशेषणधीः कारणमित्युक्तं । अन्यथा विशिष्टज्ञानत्वादित्यप्रयोजकमेव स्यात्, प्रत्युत विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाहिज्ञाने विशेषणतावच्छेदकप्रकारकधीर्हेतुरित्येव न, विशिष्टज्ञाने विशेषणज्ञानं कारणमिति सामान्यसामग्र्यैव निर्व्वाहे विशेषसामग्र्यकल्पनात् । न च द्रव्यत्वेन वन्हिज्ञाने वन्हिमानिति धीः स्यादित्यतिप्रसङ्गः, वन्हिमानिति वन्हित्वविशिष्टज्ञानं वन्हौ, वन्हिविशिष्टधीः पर्व्वते, तथाच यथा वन्हिज्ञानात्तद्विशिष्टज्ञानं, तथा वन्हित्वज्ञानात्तद्विशिष्टज्ञानं भवेत् । न च द्रव्यत्वेन ज्ञाने तदस्ति, तस्माद्यद्यद्विशिष्टज्ञानं तत्तद्विशेषणज्ञानजन्यमिति सामान्यसामग्रीतएव तत्तद्विशिष्टज्ञानं, न तु विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यज्ञानत्वावच्छेदेन कार्य्यत्वं विशेषणतावच्छेदकप्रकारकज्ञानत्वेन हेतुत्वं नीलघटवदर्थसमाजलभ्यत्वादित्युक्तं । (*Āloka*,p p. 816-817)

21 ननु विशिष्टज्ञानसमग्रीद्वयसामाजमहिम्ना विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यज्ञानोपपत्तौ तत्त्वं न कार्यतावच्छेदकं नीलघटत्ववत् । न वा तत्प्रकारकत्वं कारणतावच्छेदकमिति चेत्—न । सुरभि चन्दनमित्यादिचाक्षुषविशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यज्ञाने तदभवात् । न हि विशेषणज्ञानमात्रं विशिष्टज्ञानसामग्री, किं तु योग्यविशेषणसंनिकर्षोऽपि । गन्धे चक्षुरयोग्यत्वेन सामग्रीद्वयाभावादिति । (*Prakāśa*, p. 860).

22 प्रत्यभिज्ञा तत्तांशे परोक्षैव, (Ibid, p. 861).

23 न च विशेषणज्ञानध्वंसानुव्यवसाययोः साध्याव्याप्तिः । अनुव्यवसायभिन्नभावत्वरूपपक्षधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकत्वात् । यत्तु विशेषणज्ञानत्वेन तज्जन्यत्वं साध्यम्, तच्च तत्र नेति नोक्तदोष इत्याह । तन्न । साध्याप्रसिद्धेः, अनुमित्यादौ तथा अजनकत्वात् । (Ibid, pp.860- 861).

24 ननु दण्डिप्रत्यक्षविशेषादौ तत् प्रसिद्धमित्यरुचेराह—प्रत्यभिज्ञान इति । (Ibid, p. 861).

25 सामान्यलक्षणयेति । परंपराप्रयोजकत्वाभिप्रयेणेदमिति बोध्यम् । (Ibid, p. 861).

26 शुक्लत्वादिजातीति । यद्यपि मीमांसकानां नैतन्मतम् तथापि तवैवमप्युपपत्तिरिति भावः । (Ibid, p. 861).

27 सत्यपीति । ननु यदि जागराद्यज्ञाने संस्कारोपनीतं गोत्वादि विषयस्तदा प्रत्यभिज्ञानवत्तत्तोल्लेखापत्तिः तत्तोल्लेखे संस्कारजन्यत्वस्य नियामकत्वकल्पनादित्यरुचेराह, 'अपिचेति । (*Āloka*, p. 817).

28 प्रणिधानेति । 'निरन्तराभ्यास' इत्यादिसूत्रं संस्कारस्य प्रणिधानाद्यनेकोद्बोध्यत्वप्रतिपादकम् । (*Prakāśa*, p. 862).

29 द्विविधा चेयं द्रव्यादिप्रतीतिः । "सविकल्पाऽविकल्पा च प्रत्यक्षा बुद्धिरिष्यते" । (*Prakarana-Pañcikā,* p. 162).

30 तत्र विकल्पो नाम—भेदको धर्मः जात्यादि, स्तैस्सह विकल्पेन वर्तत इति सविकल्पकम् । तच्च जात्यादिभिर्व्यावृत्तं शब्दोल्लेखि पञ्चधा । यथा—घटोऽयम्, शुक्लोऽयम्, गच्छति गौतमः, देवदत्तोऽयम्, दण्डीति विशिष्टः प्रत्ययः ।

निर्गतो विकल्पो यस्मिन्निर्विकल्पकम् । अविकल्पशब्देन—निर्विकल्पकमुच्यते । (*Nyāya-Siddhi*, p. 160-161).

31 निर्विकल्पकनिरूपणम् । तस्य न स्वलक्षणमात्रं विषयः । जात्याद्याकारावभासस्य स्पष्टत्त्वात् । नापि सामान्यमात्रं विषयः । भेदग्रहणस्य प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वात् । (*Prakarana-Pañcikā,* p. 162).

32 ननु यदि निर्विकल्पकज्ञानस्य वस्तुस्वरूपमात्रमेव विषयः न सामान्यविशिष्टम्, तर्हि स्वलक्षणमात्रमेव सर्वज्ञानानां विषय इति सौगतसिद्धान्तसमाश्रयणं स्यादित्यात्राह—तस्य चेति । कुत

इत्याह—जात्याद्याकारावभासस्येति ।

ननु यदि निर्विकल्पके जात्याद्याकारावभासः तर्हि न सामान्यमात्रविषयत्वं स्यादित्यत्राह—नापि सामान्यमिति । न चैतावता सामान्यमात्रविषयत्वं प्रत्यक्षस्य वक्तुं शक्यत इति । कुत इत्याह—भेदग्रहणस्येति । स्पष्टदृष्टस्य निराकरणायोगात्, निराकरणे सति न कस्यचिदपि सिद्धिरित्यव्यवस्थैव स्यात् । अतश्चिदानन्दादिलक्षणस्य ब्रह्मणोऽप्यसिद्धिरेवेति प्रतीतिशरणैर्भेदो न निराकर्तव्य इत्यर्थः ।

धर्मभेदपक्षे भेदभेदिनोरपि भेदान्तरप्रसङ्गेनानवस्थापातात्, भेदप्रतिपत्तिव्यवहारयोः स्वरूपमात्रेणाप्युपपन्नत्वाच्च, स्वरूपमेव भेदः, न धर्मः । ननु यदि स्वरूपञ्चेद्भेदः, तर्हि स्वरूपग्रहणे प्रतियोग्यपेक्षाभावात्, भेदग्रहणे प्रतियोग्यपेक्षा न स्यात्, स्त्यम्, ग्रहणे न प्रतियोग्यपेक्षा, किन्तु व्यवहार इत्युक्तत्वात् । (*Nyāya-Siddhi*, p. 162).

33 'विभजति—

"आद्या विशिष्टविषया स्वरूपविषयेतरा" । इति ।

प्रथमं हि स्वरूपमात्रग्रहणं द्रव्यजातिगुणेषूपपद्यते । तच्च स्वानुभवसिद्धम् । समाहितमनस्को हि विषयान्तरानुसन्धानशून्य इन्द्रियसंयुक्तं वस्तु साक्षादुपलभत इति स्वसंविदेवात्र प्रमाणम् । (*Prakaraṇa-Pañcikā*,p.161).

"लब्धरुपे क्वचित् किञ्चि (ब्र. मि. ) दित्यादि" यदुच्यते, तदितरेतराभावविषयम्, न तु वस्तुभेदविषयम् । वस्तुभेदप्रतीत्युत्तरकालं हि परस्पराभावोऽवसीयते । घटं घटाकारतया, पटञ्च पटाकारतया विदित्वाऽयं स न भवतीति तयोरितरेतराभावं प्रतिपद्यते । घटादिविज्ञानञ्च वस्त्वन्तरग्रहणानपेक्षमित्यप्रतीतेऽपि वस्त्वन्तरे, तद्ग्रहो नानुपपन्नः । तस्मात्सामान्यविशेषौ द्वे वस्तुनी प्रतिपद्यामानं प्रत्यक्षं प्रथममुपपद्यते । किन्तु वस्त्वन्तरानुसन्धानशून्यतया सामान्यविशेषतया न प्रतीयते । अनुगतं हि सामान्यमुच्यते, व्यावृत्तिश्च विशेषः । न च वस्त्वन्तरानुसन्धानमन्तरेणानुगतिव्यावृत्ती प्रत्येतुं शक्येते । अप्रतिपद्यमानोऽपि च ते, शक्नोत्येव स्वरूपं

तयोः प्रतिपत्तुमिति, निर्विकल्पकमसामान्यविशेषविषयम् । (Ibid, pp. 863-164).

34 तथा सतीत्यादि । विशेष्यविशोषणातिरिक्तं न भासत इत्यभिमानेनेदम् । (*Prakāśa*, p. 862).

'तथासतीति, विशेषणं विशेष्यञ्च विशिष्टधीविषयो नान्यदित्यभिमानादिदमुक्तम् । (*Āloka*, p. 818).

35 'अपोहेति, यद्यप्यगोव्यावृत्तिर्गोत्वमिति निरासेऽपि गोत्वं विशेषणं गौर्विशेष्यः अतदव्यावृत्तिवैशिष्ट्यमिति न निराकृतं तदभिप्रायेणेदं निरुक्तं । (*Āloka*, p. 819).

36 एतदन्येति । एतज्ज्ञानान्यसविकल्पकान्यदेतदेव निर्विकल्पकं वा संभवति । एतद्भिन्नत्वं च बाधितमिति पक्षधर्मताबलान्निर्विकल्पकभिन्नत्वं सिध्यती त्यर्थः । (*Prakāśa*, p. 862).

37 Due to Dr, N. S. Rāmānuja Tātāchārya

38 तथा चानुभवसामग्री तत्र नास्त्येव कुतस्तत्रास्या बलवत्त्वमिति तात्पर्यम् । (*Prakāśa*, p. 867).

39 एकस्यैवेति । एवं च प्रामाणिकं गौरवमिति भावः । (Ibid, p. 864).

40 अत्रेदं चिन्त्यम् । जन्यज्ञानत्वेन विशेषणज्ञानजन्यता जन्यविशेषणज्ञानत्वेन जनकतेति नोक्तदोषः । न च विशेषणेति गौरवम्, तवापि तुल्यत्वात्, उक्तदोषनिरासार्थमेव तदन्तर्भावाच्च । किं च बीजस्य बीजजन्यत्वे तथा बीजत्वमेवोभायावच्छेदकं तथेदमस्तु । यदि च पूर्वोत्तरबीजत्वेन तथात्वम्, तदा प्रकृत्तेऽपि तथास्तु । अनवस्थापाताच्चेत्यप्ययुक्तम् । कादाचित्कं सामग्रीजन्यम् इतिवत् प्रामाणिकत्वात् । न च तत्र तथात्वेऽपि प्रकृते न तथात्वम्, जन्य ज्ञानामात्रस्य जन्यज्ञानजन्यत्वे ज्ञानाविरामे प्रायणाद्यनुपपत्तेरिति वाच्यम् । अविरललग्नज्ञानधाराभ्युपगमे हि तथा स्यात् । प्रथमानुभवे च स्मरणस्य हेतुत्वात् तस्य च जन्मान्तरानुभवजन्यत्वात् एवं तत्पूर्वजन्मनीति प्रायणाद्युपपत्तेः । एवं चानवस्थायाः क्वचिद्विश्रामस्वीकारे सामान्यतो व्यभिचारावगमात् विशिष्टपदं सार्थकमित्यपि निरस्तमित्यपि बोध्यम् ।

अपि च निर्विकल्पकाभ्युपगमेऽपि तस्यादृष्टद्वारा जन्यज्ञानजन्यतया जन्यज्ञानं ज्ञानजन्यमिति व्याप्तेरुभयसिद्धत्वात्कथं नानवस्था । प्रथामिकज्ञानस्यादृष्टद्वारा जन्मान्तरज्ञानजन्यत्वादिति यदि, तदा प्राथमिकस्मरणस्य संस्कारद्वारा जन्मान्तरानुभवजन्यतया ममापि तुल्यमिति ।

किं च जन्यानुभवत्वं जन्यतावच्छेदकमस्तु वैशिष्ट्यप्रवेशे गौरवात्, अनुभवत्वस्य जातित्वेन बलवत्त्वात् । पूर्वोक्तयुक्त्या विशेषणज्ञानस्यानुभवमात्रजनकत्वात् । एवं च प्राथमिकज्ञान–हेतुस्मरणेऽपि न तदपेक्षेति कुतोऽनवस्थेति । (*Prakāśa*,p p. 864-865).

41 वैशिष्ट्यमपि विशेषणमिति भ्रान्त्या देशयति—नन्विति । (Ibid, p. 865).

42 प्रत्यक्षमेवैतदिति पदात् निर्विकल्पकमिति तु मतान्तरेण बोध्यम् । (Ibid, p. 867).

43 एवं सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तिजन्यमपि निर्विकल्पकमस्तु । तथा च तज्जन्यप्रत्यक्षे तद्व्यभिचारानवकाशः । यदि चावश्यकसंनिकर्षादेव तदुपपत्तौ न तज्ज्ञानं हेतुः तदा विशेषणज्ञानेऽपि तुल्यम् । यद्विशेषयोरिति न्यायोऽपि तुल्य एव ।

अथ सामान्यप्रत्यासत्तेः स्वप्रकारकज्ञानमात्रे सामर्थ्यात् तज्जन्यनिर्विकल्पकमिति चेत्—न । स्वभिन्नप्रकारके तत्सामर्थ्यकल्पनात् । न चैवं गौरवम्, उक्तयुक्त्या तद्धेतुत्वे सिद्धे तन्मूलकत्वेन प्रामाणिकत्वात् । अन्यथा निर्विकल्पककल्पनायामेव गौरवं स्यात् । अस्तु वा तथा, तथापि पुरोवर्तिना वैशिष्ट्यविषयकत्वस्यापि तज्ज्ञाने संभवात् तदंशे स्वप्रकारकत्वमपि न दुर्लभम् । न चाप्रसिद्धसाध्यकानुमितौ व्यभिचारान्न तथा । तस्यैकदेशिमतत्वेन मतान्तरे तथाप्यप्रतीकारादिति चिन्त्यम् । (*Prakāśa*, pp. 867-868).

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(5) Jaipuri Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa -- Nyāya Siddhi, commentary on (7) in (7)

(6) Rucidatta Miśra --- Prakāśa, commentary on (2) in (2)

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# ERRATA

| PAGE | LINE | FOR | READ |
|---|---|---|---|
| ii | 11 | MUNSHIRAM MANOARLAL | MUNSHIRAM MANOHARLAL |
| 3 | 12 | indeteminateness | indeterminateness |
| 4 | 4 | anumitiva | anumititva |
| 6 | 28 | repetion | repetition |
| 6 | 29 | to be regard | to be to regard |
| 10 | 3 | is is | is |
| 13 | 25 | realy | really |
| 17 | 9 | qualifer | qualifier |
| 23 | 17 | qualifer | qualifier |
| 28 | 29 | propetrty | property |
| 31 | 29 | possiblity | possibility |
| 34 | 30 | Devaddatta | Devadatta |
| 36 | 23 | peroception | perception |
| 38 | 7 | univrsal | universal |
| 41 | 2 | agrument | argument |
| 44 | 35 | the this | that this |
| 46 | 15 | (bheda) | (bheda). |
| 46 | 21 | evey | every |
| 47 | 2 | commparison | comparison |
| 47 | 24 | qualifieness | qualifierness |
| 48 | 5 | difficuly | difficulty |
| 52 | 2 | (a) | (A) |
| 52 | 2 | '(the) cow' | '(the) cow' is |
| 57 | 30 | the rule. | the rule |
| 58 | 9 | Rucidata's | Rucidatta's |
| 59 | 6 | postion | position |
| 59 | 30 | says this | says that this |
| 66 | 5 | invididual | individual |
| 67 | 13 | (non-signiicant) | (non-significant) |
| 67 | 13 | bule | blue |
| 74 | 9 | yet is | yet it |
| 74 | 9 | qualicand | qualificand |
| 80 | 33 | aranged | arranged |
| 81 | 2 | propetrty | property |
| 81 | 4 | indeterminatenness | indeterminateness |

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Sibajiban Bhattacharyya taught philosophy for fortyfive years in different Universities and Institutes in India and abroad. He has published several books, edited Journals and books in philosophy, and has pblished innumerable articles, discussion notes, reviews in different Journals, Anthologies, Encyclopaedias, Indian and foreign. Professor Bhattacharyya is now a National Fellow of the Indian Council of Philsophical Research, New Delhi.

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